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Abstract
The aim of this evaluation is to provide evidence on the effectiveness of JobsPlus, a financial incentive launched
in 2013 and consisting of employment subsidies for long-term unemployed. The JobsPlus scheme provides two
treatment types: a subsidy of e7,500 for employees who had been unemployed for between one and two years,
and a subsidy of e10,000 for employees who had been unemployed for more than two years. This analysis
covers entrants from the scheme inception in July 2013 to April 2016. The effect of JobsPlus is estimated
separately for the two types of subsidy exploiting the detailed information on unemployed past working histories,
available in the Jobseekers Longitudinal Dataset (JLD) administrative database, applying a matching approach.
The results point to a positive impact of the subsidy on JobsPlus participants who, after the programme, are
less likely to be in receipt of unemployment-related benefits and show a higher probability to earn more and to
work for more weeks in a year. For those we can observe over the longest duration subsequent to their JobsPlus
start (four years), the difference between the two groups in their probability of receiving unemployment benefits
is between 11.1 percentage points (unemployed for at least one year) and 16.4 percentage points (unemployed
for at least two years).
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Collaboration between DEASP and JRC
This evaluation is the final output of the collaboration between Irish Government Economic and Evaluation Service
(IGEES) economists and Irish Government Statistical Service (IGSS) statisticians in the Statistics and Business
Intelligence Unit in the Department of Employment Affairs and Social Protection (DEASP), and researchers of the
Centre for Research on Impact Evaluation (CRIE), part of the Competence Centre on Microeconomic Evaluation
(CC-ME) of the Joint Research Centre (JRC) of the European Commission.
This study was carried out within the Data Fitness Initiative for Counterfactual Impact Evaluation (CIE), launched
in February 2016 by the Directorate General Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion (DG EMPL) and the CRIE
to promote the use of CIE for the evaluation of European Social Fund (ESF) interventions.
This collaboration has strengthened interactions between governmental institutions and the European Commis-
sion and makes scientific contribution to the evidence on the impact of ESF interventions.
2
Executive Summary
Context
JobsPlus is one measure used by the Irish Public Employment Service (Intreo) to address the labour market
disadvantage of people who are long-term unemployed by means of a hiring subsidy. Over the period of
analysis, there were two subsidy amounts paid in respect of JobsPlus employees: those who were unemployed
for at least one year (attracting a subsidy of e7,500) and those who were unemployed for at least two years
(attracting a subsidy of e10,000).
This evaluation of JobsPlus covers those in receipt of the subsidy from its inception in July 2013 to April 2016
and measures outcomes subsequent to the two-year maximum duration in receipt of the subsidy (i.e. from July
2015 to April 2018).
The evaluation was completed in early 2020, prior to the emergence of Covid-19 and the introduction of the
related public health measures and restrictions on economic activity that have had a substantial impact on
the labour market in Ireland.1 While the long-term impact on the labour market is as yet uncertain, large
inflows to unemployment typically lead to increases in long-term unemployment approximately one year later.
Thus, long-term unemployed people, who this study focuses on, represent a cohort whose number may grow if
employment prospects do not improve in the medium term.
Key points on the impact of JobsPlus
The study compared the cohort of people who benefited from JobsPlus with a matched control group of people
(i.e. people with similar characteristics) who did not avail of the subsidy. In summary, it found a positive impact
of 11.1 and 16.4 percentage points, equivalent to a 57% reduction in the likelihood of unemployment. The
probability of receiving unemployment payments drops to 9% from 20%. For people unemployed for a longer
period, the probability of receiving unemployment payments drops to 13% from 29%. This decrease of 16.4
percentage points equates to a 56% improvement in outcome.
At a simple level, by comparing those who benefited from JobsPlus with all of those who were eligible but who
did benefit from JobsPlus, we can get an initial (albeit, somewhat crude) estimate of the impact of JobsPlus.
Four years after commencing receipt of JobsPlus, the difference in the probability of receiving unemployment
benefits was 20 percentage points lower than for those who did not benefit from the subsidy.
When we compare outcomes to the carefully matched control group, the impact – although lower – is still highly
positive and, although it tends to decrease over time, a statistically significant effect is still found after 48
months. This result indicates that JobsPlus is a valuable and effective labour market intervention to help people
who are long-term unemployed to secure employment.
For those we can observe over the longest duration subsequent to their JobsPlus start (four years), the difference
between the two groups in their probability of receiving unemployment benefits is between 11.1 and 16.4
percentage points:
JobsPlus eligibility category Unemployed for at least 1 year Unemployed for at least 2 years
Difference in probability of receiving unemployment benefits, four years after a JobsPlus start
11.1 percentage points
56.6% reduction compared to control group
16.4 percentage points
55.9% reduction compared to control group
The impact of JobsPlus is seen not just in the difference in the probability of receiving unemployment benefits
but also in the number of weeks of insurable employment in subsequent years. Three and four years after
starting JobsPlus, depending on when they start the programme, participants work an average of 14.3 weeks
more than the matched group of eligible non-participants. The difference is slightly larger for those who qualify
for the subsidy at the higher rate, at 16.6 weeks.
JobsPlus eligibility category Unemployed for at least 1 year Unemployed for at least 2 years
Difference in mean number of weeks of insurable employment, four years after a JobsPlus start
14.3 weeks
51.5% increase compared to control group
16.6 weeks
72.4% increase compared to control group
The effect is confirmed by the difference between the two groups in respect of earnings from employment. Four
years after the start of JobsPlus, those who benefitted from the subsidy have annual earnings from employ-
ment approximately e6,000 higher than the matched group of eligible non-participants. For those who were
unemployed for at least one year, earnings from employment increased to e28,000 from =Ce22,000 while the
increase for those who were unemployed for at least two years was to =Ce26,000 from e20,000. These are
increases of 27% and 29% respectively.
1For context, see: https://www.cso.ie/en/csolatestnews/presspages/2020/labourforcesurveyquarter22020andlabourmarketinsightseries1/
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Does the impact vary across different cohorts?
One of the important considerations in an evaluation is whether mean values obscure the fact that a subsidy
may work well for some cohorts and not at all for others. In other words, the overall effect may be positive
but this may be due to a positive effect for one particular (large) group and negative effects for other (smaller)
groups. To probe this, we examine results by age group and previous earnings.
Most importantly, the positive impact of JobsPlus is visible across all age categories. There are slight differences
in how the subsidy affects different age categories, and this varies according to the outcome variable examined.
JobsPlus eligibility category Unemployed for at least 1 year Unemployed for at least 2 years
Age group with the largest difference in probability of receiving unemployment benefits, four years after a JobsPlus start 36-45 years 26-35 years
JobsPlus eligibility category Unemployed for at least 1 year Unemployed for at least 2 years
Age group with the largest difference in number of weeks of insurable employment, four years after a JobsPlus start Under 25 years 46-55 years
JobsPlus eligibility category Unemployed for at least 1 year Unemployed for at least 2 years
Age group with the largest absolute difference in earnings from employment, four years after a JobsPlus start 36-45 years 46-55 years
When we group people by their earnings from employment prior to becoming unemployed, and then measure
the probability of receiving unemployment benefits as well as the number of weeks of insurable employment,
the effect of JobsPlus is strongest for those with the highest earnings prior to becoming unemployed. This is
true for people unemployed for at least one year and for those unemployed for at least two years. The absolute
difference in earnings four years after a JobsPlus start is greatest for those in the third quartile (as measured
by earnings from employment prior to becoming unemployed).
Once again, the mean value does not hide a negative impact for particular cohorts when we group people by
their earnings prior to becoming unemployed. While the impact varies across different age groups and quartiles
of earnings, the impact of the subsidy is positive for all cohorts.
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1 Introduction
JobsPlus is a financial incentive designed to encourage employers to recruit people from the count of jobseeker
claimants, i.e. the Live Register, who are long-term unemployed. Employers who hire a long-term unemployed
person and complete the JobsPlus application process can receive a subsidy of e7,500 for employee who has
been unemployed for between one and two years, and e10,000 for an employee who has been unemployed for
more than two years (payment levels have changed since January 2018; see appendix for details).
The incentive is tipically paid to employers from the date the new employee starts to work for them. Pay-
ments are made each month in arrears over a two-year period. JobsPlus is operated by the Department of
Employment Affairs and Social Protection (DEASP) and commenced in July 2013.
This evaluation estimates the impact of JobsPlus by modelling the counterfactual, i.e. what would have
happened to long-term unemployed people if the subsidy had not been available.
The outline of the report is as follows. Firstly, we describe the policy background together with the Irish
institutional framework and labour market. Secondly, we describe the JobsPlus programme, the data available
for the evaluation, and our methodological approach with reference to the related literature. Finally, we present
the estimated results, and discuss on potential modifications of policy design and future developments of data
structure and empirical analysis.
2 Policy Background
JobsPlus was created as part of the Irish Government’s twin labour market activation and employment strategies.
These include the Pathways to Work and the Action Plan for Jobs2, which were first developed in 2012, as the
Public Employment Service moved from passive income support to more active engagement with jobseekers. As
well as engaging with jobseekers through the activation process, and referring jobseekers to retraining opportu-
nities, the strategies aimed to make it more attractive for employers to hire jobseekers on the Live Register.
JobsPlus is referenced in Action 33 of Pathways to Work 2013 “Develop and implement the JobsPlus re-
cruitment incentive. Review take-up and develop process systems and promotional capability as required to
encourage and support significant take-up of the new initiative amongst employers and the Action Plan for
Jobs" (Disruptive Reform 5: Make it attractive for businesses to hire additional employees from the Live Register
through the JobsPlus Initiative).
As recovery took hold and economic prospects improved, subsequent labour market strategies under the
Pathways to Work umbrella placed greater emphasis on those who had not yet returned to work, i.e. the
long-term unemployed.
Pathways to Work 2016-2020 emphasised both the target group of JobsPlus, the long-term unemployed,
and the mechanism by which it works, incentivising employers to hire the long-term unemployed. Strand 1 of
Pathways to Work 2016-2020 focused on enhanced engagement with unemployed people of working age and
identified long-term unemployed people as requiring additional supports to return to work. Strand 4 of Pathways
to Work 2016-2020 outlined the objective of “Incentivising employers to provide more jobs for those who are
unemployed”, reflecting the barriers faced by those who are long-term unemployed in returning to the workforce.
JobsPlus drew on the design of the two existing schemes it was set up to replace: the Revenue Job Assist
Scheme and the Employer Job (PRSI) Incentive Scheme, both of which ceased permanently in respect of all
employments commencing on or after 1 July 2013. Uptake of these schemes was low relative to the number
of unemployed people who could have been hired, with only 1,454 employers supported by the schemes in 2011.
The PRSI Incentive Scheme was somewhat similar to what transpired when JobsPlus was designed but its
eligibility criteria reflected the larger share of unemployed people with shorter durations. It exempted employers
from liability to pay their share of PRSI for certain employees for 12 months, once the employee had been in
receipt of Jobseeker’s Benefit, Jobseeker’s Allowance, One-Parent Family Payment or Disability Allowance for at
least six months. Time spent on the JobBridge internship programme or the Work Placement Programme also
counted towards eligibility.
2There have been iterations of Pathways to Work in 2012, 2013, 2015 and 2016-2020, with the publication of the next strategy
imminent.
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JobsPlus commenced in July 2013 with an initial pilot phase of 2,500 sanctioned employee places. This was
expanded to 3,000 places in June 2014 and then to 6,000 places in Budget 2015. Changes were also made
to the scheme in 2015, deeming Programme Refugees and lone parents in receipt of Jobseekers Transition
Payment to be eligible with no qualifying period.
2.1 JobsPlus and the Youth Guarantee
In February 2015 “JobsPlus Youth” was added to the scheme under the EU Youth Guarantee. This meant that
the qualifying period for those aged under 25 was reduced from 12 months to four months, corresponding
to the target under the Youth Guarantee to offer a young person training course, apprenticeship, traineeship,
placement or employment within four months of leaving school or losing a job. Young people are provided with
certification that they qualify for the subsidy at the lower rate of payment and are in a position to use this
certification in job applications with employers.
Primary legislation was required to allow positive discrimination on age grounds in the provision of employ-
ment services and supports. The Social Welfare and Pensions Act 2014, which allows positive discrimination,
was passed in June 2014. The Act allows the full implementation of the Youth Guarantee and, in particular, the
process of earlier engagement with under-25s.
Funding for JobsPlus Youth places is provided by a tripartite arrangement whereby one-third of the cost is
met by each of the DEASP, the European Social Fund (ESF) and the Youth Employment Initiative (YEI). The ESF is
Europe’s main instrument for supporting jobs, helping people get better jobs and ensuring fairer job opportunities
for all EU citizens.
The YEI is one of the main EU financial resources to support the implementation of Youth Guarantee
schemes. It provides support to young people living in regions where youth unemployment was higher than
25% in 2012, with the criteria updated in 2017 to refer to regions with youth unemployment higher than 25%
in 2016. Funding for the YEI comes from a dedicated Youth Employment budget line and ESF national allocations.
Places on JobsPlus are funded initially by the DEASP. Subsequently, applications for ESF rebates are made
in respect of all compliant JobsPlus applications for participants who were under 25 years of age at the com-
mencement of the employment.
3 Irish Institutional Framework
The DEASP administers over 70 separate schemes and services throughout Ireland to promote active participation
in society by providing income supports and employment services through its Public Employment Services (PES)
function, and other services. These services comprise administration of a wide range of social insurance and
social assistance schemes, including pensions, benefits, allowances and grants for children, people of working
age, carers, people with disabilities, and older people. Additional services include activation, employment and
community services and programmes to promote development, progression, participation, and social involvement
of clients. Overall, the Department is responsible for:
— advising the Government and formulating appropriate social protection policies;
— designing, developing and delivering effective and cost-efficient income supports, activation and employ-
ment services, advice to customers and other related services; and
— working towards seamless service delivery in conjunction with other Departments, Agencies and bodies in
the delivery of Government policies.
The current structure of the DEASP is a result of incremental policy reforms beginning in the mid-1990s, in
part driven by a broader recognition that the welfare state needed to adapt to changing labour market dynamics.
The current process of reforms was initiated in 1996 by the European Employment Strategy (EES), requiring all
EU member states to set out actions for the implementation of EES guidelines, through the development of
national action plans. Starting with the National Employment Action Plans (NEAPs) in the 1990s, through to the
National Employment and Entitlements Service (NEES) in 2011, and finally through to the introduction of the first
Intreo pilots in 2012, each subsequent stage in employment policy evolution introduced a discrete set of reforms.
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These reforms have gradually shifted the PES towards a model that is underpinned by a pro-active acti-
vation approach. Labour market activation policies are designed to give jobseekers a better chance at finding
employment through engagements such as education or training schemes, employment support schemes, or
internships. DEASP activation efforts involve engaging working-age adults with a focus on moving into employ-
ment, in line with broader social protection reforms that operate from a social contract approach to receipt of
welfare payments.
The DEASP delivers its services through Intreo centres, which are now single points of contact for all employ-
ment and income supports throughout Ireland. In Ireland, the PES is managed by the DEASP and is delivered via
two main channels: directly through Intreo centres and through contractors.
At present, contracted services are provided by the following contractors:
— EmployAbility;
— Local Employment Services;
— Job Clubs;
— JobPath.
EmployAbility
EmployAbility provides an employment support service for people with a health condition, injury, illness or
disability and a recruitment advice service for the business community.
Local Employment Service The LES is a one-to-one career path planning and placement service, on a case
management basis, for unemployed people. The LES engages primarily with long-term unemployed jobseekers
who are referred directly to the LES by Intreo offices for activation. The LES also provide services to other
client groups including people with a disability, lone parents, early school leavers, qualified adults, ex-offenders,
members of the travelling community and refugees.
Job Clubs Job Clubs provide structured support to job ready jobseekers (with the necessary training, education
and motivation) to secure and retain paid employment in the open labour market and is a final transition mech-
anism for jobseekers.
JobPath JobPath, a contracted, payment-by-results employment service, provides additional resources to en-
able the provision of a high-quality case managed employment support service to people who are long-term
unemployed.
Figure 1 outlines the process by which jobseekers engage in activation, subsequent to registering a claim,
having the claim processed and receiving payment. An initial group information session identifies the service
and what is expected from the client. This is followed by a one to one meeting with a case officer, at which the
jobseeker agrees a Personal Progression Plan (PPP). At an Activation Review Meeting (ARM), the PPP is reviewed
and new goals and actions agreed. The case officer works with the jobseeker for 12 months or until the jobseeker
commences employment or education.
Where engagement with Intreo identifies a training requirement, provision is primarily the responsibility of SO-
LAS, i.e. the State organisation with responsibility for funding, planning and co-ordinating further education and
training (FET) in Ireland.
Finally, the Employer Relations function is an area of increasing importance in the Irish PES and has a clear
role to play in the promotion of incentives such as JobsPlus.
4 The Irish labour market
4.1 Employment levels
Between Q1 2007 and Q1 2012, the total number of people unemployed in Ireland more than tripled from
115,000 to 351,800, with the unemployment rate increasing from 5% to just under 16% in the same period.
At the introduction of JobsPlus in 2013, the Irish labour market was beginning to recover. After the post-crisis
drop in employment levels, reaching a low of 1,863,500 in Q1 2012, total employment continued on the path to
recovery, passing the 2 million mark in Q3 2014 and overtaking the pre-crisis high point in Q2 2018. The most
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Figure 1: From jobseeker claim to activation
recent value, Q3 2019, is estimated at 2,326,900.
Although the absolute value for the number of people employed is higher, the employment rate, which
measures proportion of the working age population in employment, has yet to return to previous levels. Q3
2007 represented the pre-crisis high for the Irish employment rate (72.5%). During the crisis, the employment
rate reached its lowest point in Q1 2012, dropping to 59.3%. The recovery in the employment rate has continued
since then, most recently measuring 69.6% in Q3 2019.
4.2 Long-term unemployment
Duration of unemployment is a key consideration for this evaluation, both in terms of the effects of long-term
unemployment on likely re-entry to employment and as a qualifying criterion for benefiting from the JobsPlus
subsidy during employment.
Following the initial onset of the economic crisis, widespread job losses led to an increase in short-term
unemployment. This temporarily reduced the share of unemployment accounted for by those who are long-term
unemployed (unemployed for one year or more). However, the absence of an immediate recovery meant that a
proportion of the first wave of unemployed people became long-term unemployed.
The number of long-term unemployed people, as a percentage of all unemployed people, is now at 27.3% as
of Q3 2019, having fallen from a high point of 61.9% in Q1 2011. The share of long-term unemployment, i.e.
the number of people unemployed for one year or more as a percentage of the total labour force (aged 15-74),
increased consistently from the onset of the crisis and reached a peak of 9.8% in Q1 2012. The current value
is 1.4% (Q3 2019).
The increase in long-term unemployment applied to both men and women. In Q1 2007, long-term unem-
ployment as a percentage of the labour force stood at 1.6% for men and 1% for women, dramatically increasing
to 12.3% and 6.7%, respectively, by Q1 2012. Since then, values for men and women have been on a downward
trend, with Q3 2019 values at 1.7% for men and 1% for women.
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Figure 2: Quarterly unemployment (000s), Q3 2013 - Q2 2018, source: QLF01, LFS, CSO
4.3 Population and labour force
Along with an increasing population in the period since the crisis, the labour force has also increased, from
2,256,300 in Q2 2013, when JobsPlus was launched, to 2,454,900 in Q3 2019. This has largely been a function
of the increase in the working age population, as the participation rate remains somewhat lower than its 2007
peak. The overall participation rate was 64% in 2007 but dropped to 60% in 2012, reflected depressed demand
for labour. The participation rate has been relatively stable at about 60% since 2012 and currently stands
at 62.5% in Q3 2019. The ongoing fall in participation among the young is being offset by a recovery in
participation rates among older men.
Figure 3: Labour force by age group, Q3 2013 - Q2 2018, source: LFS, CSO
4.4 Sectoral shifts
There have been sectoral changes in the Irish labour market over the period, with changes in levels and shares
of various sectors.
The retail sector represented the largest NACE sector of employment in 2010, at over 14%, while admin-
istrative services represented the smallest at under 4%. Over the decade that followed, significant shifts have
occurred in the sectoral distribution of employment. Retail remains the largest contributor to total employment
and its share has reduced only slightly. The smallest sector in the economy in terms of the number of people
employed is currently agriculture, forestry and fishing, accounting for 4.4% of jobs.
ICT, administration and support services grew strongly, while, the construction sector decreased sharply in
2008 and 2009. However it increased by 35% between Q1 2010 and Q2 2018, even though employment is
still 90,000 units below where it was prior to the crisis, in Q1 2007.
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Figure 4: Economic Sectors in Q3 2013 and Q2 2018.
Source: EHQ03 & QLF03, Statbank Services, CSO
4.5 Jobseekers register: Live Register
Ireland’s count of registered jobseekers is called the Live Register (see Appendix for more information). It
counts claimants for Jobseeker’s Benefit (Ireland’s insurance-based unemployment payment) and applicants for
Jobseeker’s Allowance (Ireland’s means-tested unemployment payment) and those signing for credited social
insurance contributions. Once seasonal fluctuations are taken into account, the Live Register has been on a
downward trend throughout the operation of JobsPlus. More specifically, the composition of the Live Register
is changing such that the share of long-term unemployed people has decreased to under 40% in 2019 (see
table and figure below). The pool of potential recipients of the JobsPlus subsidy is a declining share of an
ever-decreasing Live Register. This is an important point in assessing whether the subsidy has an impact across
a time of increasing employment and, consequently, a Live Register population that is changing in composition
over time. The table below shows the share of long-term claims that have durations greater than three years.
It has increased over the time frame considered in this analysis. Similarly, within a specific age cohort, those
aged more than 50, the proportion of long-term unemployed people whose claims are greater than three years
has increased. This highlights the ongoing challenge of addressing the labour market disadvantage of particular
cohorts even as the overall number of people receiving jobseeker payments decreases.
Live Register claims, excluding casual claims July 2013 April 2016 August 2017
Durations of one year or more (LTU) 197,472 138,183 111,799
Of which, durations of three years or more 103,595 79,483 64,768
Durations of three years or more, as share of LTU 0.52 0.58 0.58
Over 50 years, durations of one year or more 52,844 50,512 42,769
Over 50 years, durations of three years or more 30,053 32,246 28,533
Over 50 years and durations of three years or more, as share of LTU 0.57 0.64 0.67
It is also worth noting the significant number of part-time workers (or casual claimants) who are signing on
the Live Register but are not unemployed. This group numbered 90,000 in early 2013 and has fallen to just
over 35,000 as of October 2019, representing almost 20% of the total Live Register.
Year 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Live Register population with duration greater than 12 months (average of 52 weekly values) 179,464 159,551 136,870 110,796 91,102
Share of the Live Register population with duration greater than 12 months 46.7% 46.3% 45.0% 42.6% 41.2%
5 Description of the intervention: how JobsPlus operates
5.1 Eligibility
JobsPlus is targeted at long-term jobseekers. A grant of e7,500 is payable over two years for the following
categories of jobseekers:
— jobseekers under 25 years of age and on the Live Register for at least 4 months (104 days) in the previous
6 months. This element of the incentive is co-funded by the ESF;
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Figure 5: Live Register long-term unemployed
— jobseekers over 25 years of age who are on the Live Register and have been at least 12 months (312
days) unemployed in the previous 18 months;
— former One-Parent Family Payment recipients whose youngest child is seven years of age or over and are
now in receipt of Jobseekers Allowance Transitional (JST) payment, in which case no qualifying periods
applies; and
— persons with refugee status and in receipt of Jobseekers Allowance, in which no qualifying period applies.
A grant of e10,000 is payable over two years for the category of jobseekers over 25 years of age who are
on the Live Register and have been at least 24 months (624 days) unemployed in the previous 30 months.
People who are signing for credited contributions rather than in receipt of a jobseekers payment are eligible
once they meet the eligibility requirement of the number of days on the Live Register. Persons who were in
receipt of qualifying jobseeker payments or credited contributions, who spent time on the programmes listed
below may count this time towards the qualifying period. To do so, the jobseekers re-establish entitlement to
a qualifying jobseekers payment prior to commencing employment or the employee can verify that their finan-
cial/family circumstances have not changed during the period they were participating on one of the initiatives
listed below: Community Employment, the Rural Social Scheme, Jobseekers Transitional Payment, Tús, Gateway,
Back to Education Allowance, Back to Work Enterprise Allowance, Short-term Enterprise Allowance, Springboard
courses and short duration training courses provided by SOLAS/ETB.
JobsPlus is not open to the following cohorts:
— those on non-Live Register payments such as illness and disability payments and One-Parent Family
Payment (excluding JST);
— those in receipt of a payment under systematic short-time working; and
— persons in receipt of the Wage Subsidy Scheme.
The incentive is not open to persons on apprenticeships or in training or work experience.
In this evaluation we focus on the categories of jobseekers over 25 years of age who are on the Live Register
and have been unemployed at least 12 months in the previous 18 months, or 24 months in the previous 30
months.
5.2 The typical JobsPlus process
5.3 Employer verification procedure and registration
JobsPlus is available to all employers in the private (including commercial semi-state), community, not-for-
profit and voluntary sectors. It is not open to public service employers. Employers can avail of JobsPlus when
filling new positions or positions that arise as a consequence of natural turnover and must meet the following
conditions:
— the businesses must be registered as a Pay As You Earn(PAYE) employer with Revenue;
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Figure 6: JobsPlus Process
— the employers must be compliant with Irish tax and employment laws. Employers are asked to give an
officer of the DEASP permission to check their status with Revenue and to obtain a tax clearance certificate
using Revenue’s online service;
— the employers must offer full-time employment of over 30 hours per week, spanning at least four days
per week. The eligible employee must be on payroll and subject to PAYE and Pay Related Social Insurance
(PRSI); and
— the employers must give details of their workforce prior to application. Where an increase in the work
force is not evident, employers are asked to provide additional information to the Department to support
the application.
An employer who decides to recruit an additional employee must provide basic information such as the
name of company, size of workforce, bank details and economic sector through an online application form.
The employer must also provide permission for the Department to check tax clearance certificates online. The
Department reviews the application, verifies the data and checks the tax clearance certificate. If in order, the
employer receives a confirmation e-mail. The employers can proceed with recruitment once eligibility confirma-
tion from the Department is received.
After eligibility has been checked, the jobseeker completes the JobsPlus1 form and sign a declaration (part
A). This is forwarded to prospective employers outlining the incentive that comes with hiring that person. On
successfully securing employment, the employer completes part B and returns the form to the Department
(having registered at www.jobsplus.ie).
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6 Data and sample selection
6.1 The data
Data used for the analysis is taken from the Jobseekers Longitudinal Dataset (JLD), an administrative database
managed by the DEASP. The database tracks social welfare claims, activation, training, and employment histo-
ries over time, covering individuals with jobseeker or one parent family claims since 2004. It draws together
payment and administrative data from the DEASP - largely, but not limited to, the payments that comprise the
Live Register - as well as data from the SOLAS and the Revenue Commissioners. It has its origins in efforts to
make best use of the sizeable volume of data collected or generated by the Department and to structure the
recording of episodes of unemployment and training in a meaningful way.
The data is structured in a way that bears some relation to a panel dataset but with important distinctions.
To reflect the individual experience of employment and unemployment, the data are re-arranged as a series
of episodes, with one episode beginning when the person begins a spell of unemployment and ending when
the person moves to employment or another activation or training programme. Importantly, the beginning of
an unemployment spell coincides with the time an individual starts claiming unemployment-related benefits,
namely Jobseekers Benefit and Jobseekers Allowance.
The next episode begins when the person’s status changes again. In this way, JLD data differs from panel
data since observations are not recorded at a fixed point in time but at points of transition from one status
to another. One of the advantages of restructuring the administrative data of the Department in this way
is that it retains some element of the individual’s experience of unemployment. When a client of the DEASP
moves from Jobseekers Benefit to Jobseekers Allowance, this change of status is treated as an exit from the
former and an entry to the latter on the Live Register. In the JLD, contiguous periods on Jobseekers Benefit
and Jobseekers Allowance can be linked and represented as one episode of unemployment, which is arguably a
better representation of the experience of the absence of work, regardless of whether it is on a social insurance
or social assistance programme of income support.
Jobseekers Benefit is a weekly payment from the DEASP to people who are out of work, who are fully unem-
ployed or are in part-time employment because their working week was reduced by the employer. It is applicable
to jobseekers who have paid pay-related social insurance (PRSI) at the appropriate class and who have sufficient
contributions in the relevant tax year and have a total of 104 contributions paid. Jobseeker’s Allowance is a
means-tested payment made to jobseekers who are unemployed and do not qualify for Jobseeker’s Benefit or
whose entitlement to Jobseeker’s Benefit has expired.
For the purposes of the analysis, the JLD has been enhanced with social insurance contributions and earnings
data.3 These data are collected on behalf of the DEASP for the purposes of administering the Social Insurance
Fund.
The full database consists of 11,185,001 episodes for 1,805,084 individuals from January 2004 to April
2018. Each episode has a start and an end date, and an operational code allowing to identify the state of an
individual during time-span corresponding to the spell. There are more than 250 different codes in the original
database, each of them corresponding to a different combination of activation/training activities, welfare claims,
and time spent in employment. It is also important to stress that episodes defined this way can overlap in time.
Additional information is also available at individual level, including gender, date of birth, county where claims
are made, and the last recorded occupation.
For individuals who participated in JobsPlus, DEASP also provided a separate monitoring database, linkable
to the JLD using individual identifiers, containing treatment-specific information, including: i) JobsPlus start/end
dates ; ii) the number of days on the Live Register at the beginning of JobsPlus, i.e. the recorded eligiblity count;
and iii) the treatment type (12/18 and 24/30).
6.2 Selection of the treatment group
For the purpose of this analysis, individual episodes in the JLD have been aggregated using their operational
codes, into two mutually exclusive categories: “eligibility” and “non-eligibility” episodes. Eligibility episodes are
those that count towards eligibility according to the JobsPlus rules, i.e. Live Register episodes corresponding
3Annual earnings are defined as total taxable earnings, or gross earnings less employee contributions to health insurance, superannuation
(including contributions to the spouse’s scheme, additional voluntary contributions, purchased notional service), the pension levy, union
subscriptions, and the travel pass scheme.
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to jobseekers payments. After having re-classified episodes and solved overlapping issues, individual labour
market histories have been re-arranged in an individual-level monthly panel dataset containing information
for each individual i in each month m from January 2004 to April 2018 about the number of days spent in
eligibility episodes, according to the two eligibility criteria. This allows us to re-construct the eligibility condition,
each month we count backward 18 (30) months and check if i accrued 12 (24) months on the Live Register. A
month is counted as valid for the eligibility condition if in that month the number of days spent in the eligibility
condition is higher than 15.4
We then check if the eligibility computed ex-post at the time of transition into JobsPlus, matches the
eligibility recorded in the administrative database. To this aim we link the information contained in the JobsPlus
monitoring database for treated units to the monthly panel dataset derived from JLD. The results of this check
are summarised in Figure 7. Reassuringly, the ex-post computed and the recorded eligibility coincide in the vast
majority of cases - 11,914 out of the 14,838 treated individuals in the monitoring database. This is to say
treated units for whom the recorded number of days on the Live Register is between 312 and 623 (more than
624) and the ex-post computed eligibility is equal to 12 months over 18 (24 months over 30).
Figure 7: Eligibility: Computed (CE) vs Recorded (RE)
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the monitoring database
The treated units to be considered for analysis are selected according to the following procedure.
— The first step of the sample selection is to exclude from the group of treated individuals those for whom
the recorded eligibility does not match the one computed ex-post. The rationale for this selection is that
the computed eligibility is the key criteria used to identify individuals in the control group.
— As second step, since the objective of the analysis is to measure the impact of the policy after the end of
the subsidy, we also exclude from the treatment group individuals who started JobsPlus after April 2016,
i.e. those who can be observed for less than the full duration of the subsidy.
Figure 8 shows the cumulative distribution of the number of months available after the end of the subsidy. The
proportion of individuals who can be observed for at least one month after the end of the full subsidy is roughly
60% in the 24/30 group, and 75% in the 12/18 group. For earlier participants, we can observe labour market
outcomes for almost three years, whereas the observation window for later starters is much reduced.
4In the vast majority of cases, the number of days spent in the eligibility condition is equal to 30.
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Figure 8: Months available after JP
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For the 7,967 treated individuals under analysis, the information contained in the monthly panel dataset has
been subsequently used to determine the month of entry in the eligibility condition. The time elapsed between
the entry in eligibility and the start of JobsPlus is another important element to consider.
— We finally exclude from the sample those individuals for whom the distance, in months, between entry in
eligibility and exit to JobsPlus is higher than 100.
The cumulative distribution of this distance is shown in Figure 9. The lighter blue curve shows the distribution
for those who started JobsPlus on the basis of being eligible for 12 of the previous 18 months, while the darker
blue curve shows the distribution for those who started JobsPlus on the basis of being eligible for 24 of the
previous 30 months. It is evident that for individuals in the 12/18 group the transition between eligibility and
JobsPlus happens much faster than for those in the 24/30 group. After one year in eligibility, roughly 90% of
the individuals in the 12/18 group start working under the JobsPlus subsidy, while for the 24/30 group, this
transition from eligibility to JobsPlus work happens for only 15% of the individuals. This means that individuals
in the 12/18 group started JobsPlus so fairly quickly after reaching eligibility, while individuals in the 24/30
group started JobsPlus a long time after the beginning of their prior eligibility episode.
The JobsPlus incentive is slightly higher for the 24/30 month group (e10,000 rather than e7,500). In the
case of those nearing eligibility for the higher rate, waiting for the incentive may have affected the take-up rate
for the 12/18 months variant. However, if waiting for the higher incentive was the main reason for individuals
starting JobsPlus based on 24/30 months instead of 12/18 months eligibility, we would expect most to have
commenced JobsPlus within 24 months, but this is not the case. The distance between the entry in eligibility
and the JobsPlus start was three years for approximately half of those individuals. This may reflect the greater
difficulty associated with finding employment after a long period of unemployment. To take up JobsPlus, an
individual has to both qualify and find a job, which gets harder as unemployment duration increases.
In the following two figures, the sample of treated units selected for the analysis is represented.
Figure 10 shows the JobsPlus starting months between August 2013 and April 2016, separately for the two
treatment groups. The total participation has remained fairly flat but there is considerable variability between
months. Some of this may be seasonal; communication initiatives may also have had an impact. Over the time
period, the numbers starting based on 24/30 months eligibility have risen, while those based on 12/18 months
eligibility have fallen. Over the same time period, the size and composition of the Live Register changed. The
number of those on the Live Register for one year or more fell by 43%. Of those on the Live Register for one
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Figure 9: Distance between month of inflow in eligibility and beginning of JobsPlus
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year or more, 58% were on it for 3 years or more in August 2017 and in April 2016.
The plot in Figure 11 shows the age-sex composition of the treated individuals, separately for the two treatment
groups. The figure reflects the breakdown on the Live Register, with many more men than women on the Live
Register for more than one year.
Figure 10: Distribution of the JobsPlus starting month
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Figure 11: Age-sex composition of the treatment group
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7 The evaluation framework
7.1 Background literature
Employment incentives or subsidies of similar type as JobsPlus have been widely investigated in the empirical
literature to assess their impact on labour market prospects of unemployed both in terms of probability of
finding a job and in terms of duration and stability of the new jobs. The evaluation of specific programmes of
employment subsidies normally consider both private and public sector types of subsidy, targeted at different
categories of unemployed such as young and long-term unemployed.
Based on meta-analysis of evaluations of active labour market policies (ALMP) carried between 1995 and
2007, Card et al. (2010) report that public sector employment programmes are relatively ineffective, with
respect to other types of policies, such as job search assistance programmes and training programmes. Job
search assistance programmes have generally favorable impacts, especially in the short run, while training,
including classroom and on-the-job programmes, have more positive relative impacts after two years. These
patterns emerge from an overview of different types of outcome such as employment probability, unemploy-
ment/employment duration and earnings.
This picture is confirmed also in the more recent meta-analysis performed by Card et al. (2018), where they
point out that public sector employment subsidies tend to have small or even negative average impacts both
in the short and the long run. Considering also possible heterogeneous effects from a wider sample of ALMP
evaluations, they illustrate that ALMPs effects tend to be larger for females and participants drawn from the
pool of long-term unemployed. This is valid especially for private sector employment subsidies.
From a methodological point of view, the studies that evaluate specific programmes of employment sub-
sidies follow counterfactual approaches mainly based on Matching and Difference-in-Differences (DiD). Among
the recent empirical works applying a Matching approach, there are Bellmann et al. (2018); Caliendo and
Künn (2015); Caliendo et al. (2016); Deidda et al. (2015). Only few studies apply instrumental variables ap-
proaches [Eppel (2017); Saniter and Siedler (2014), among others]. Conversely, DiD method is more largely
adopted and it is worth to mention Cammeraat et al. (2017); Kaiser and Kuhn (2016); Sestito and Viviano (2016).
In terms of the estimated impact, the evidence on subsidies is quite mixed if one considers programmes
targeted specifically at long-term unemployed, such as JobsPlus. Forslund et al. (2004) analyse a programme
of employment subsidy corresponding to 75% of total wage costs for 6 months and to 25% for another 18
months. This programmes was implemented in Sweden starting from 1998 and targeted the long-term un-
employed registered at the PES as unemployed for at least 36 months (24 months from 2000). They rely on
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exact covariate matching in a dynamic setting, accounting for all factors that jointly determine participation and
outcome of participation. They also exploit variations in programme participation caused by budget cut-backs
and changes to funding to apply instrumental variables methods in order to tackle selection issues. They show
that the programme had a positive treatment effect for the participants and also point out that subsidised jobs
in the private sector have larger dead-weight and substitution effects than other programmes. This evidence
for the private sector is shown also by Calmfors and Hemstrom (2001); Martin and Grubb (2001).
The differential impact of job subsidies for long-term unemployed and other programmes for unemployed
adults(such as labour market training, work experience programmes, public relief work, and trainee replacement)
is the focus of the analysis carried out in Sianesi (2008) on the Swedish labor market. She makes use of a
dynamic setting to estimate the effect of joining a programme compared to joining an alternative one, as well as
compared to waiting longer in open unemployment. She shows that job subsidies perform better than the other
available programmes both in terms of employment probabilities and in terms of benefit collection probability.
Recipients are indeed significantly more likely to be in employment and less likely to be on unemployment
benefits over time than participants of other programmes.
Following the same approach, Hujer and Thomsen (2010) evaluate a German Job Creation Scheme consisting
of subsidised work for individuals having been long-term unemployed (more than one year) or unemployed for
at least six out of the last 12 months prior to programme. Focusing on years 2000 and 2001, they show that
the wage subsidies (30 to 75% of the worker’s salary) in general do not prove to be effective for recipients in
terms of improvement of the labour market situation, with less favorable employment chances in East Germany
due to participation even 30 months after the start of programmes.
Other examples of evaluation of subsidies will be discussed in the following sections, while presenting
different options of evaluation strategies.
7.2 The evaluation problem
The objective of this evaluation is to investigate whether JobsPlus improved the employment prospects of
long-term unemployed individuals after the subsidy period. Identifying the causal relationship between the
intervention and individual outcomes crucially depends on solving the endogeneity bias issue stemming from
selection in the treatment.
In the potential outcomes framework based on the work by Rubin (1973a,b, 1974, 1977), the effect we are
interested in is defined as follows:
ATTt+h = E[Y
t+h
i (1)− Y
t+h
i (0)|Wi = 1]
= E[Y t+hi (1)|Wi = 1]− E[Y
t+h
i (0)|Wi = 1]
(1)
The Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT) measures the average effect of the programme on those
who participate. In the above equation Y t+hi (1) is the generic potential outcome Y for individual i measured
h months after the beginning of the subsidy in the actual scenario where the programme is in place. Y t+hi (0)
is its counterpart in the counterfactual scenario where the programme is not in place. Wi = 1 simply indicates
that individual i participates in the programme. Conditioning on Wi = 1 means that the effect is estimated on
the subgroup of treated individuals.
The fundamental problem of policy evaluation is that only one of these two scenario is observable in reality,
i.e. the one in which the programme is in place. As a consequence, the quantity E[Y t+hi (0)|Wi = 1], i.e.
the average counterfactual outcome of participants in the absence of the programme, is not observable. If
participation in the programme was randomly assigned, one could solve this “missing information” problem
estimating the average outcome of participants by simply observing the average outcome of non-participants.5
In the context of JobsPlus, participation in the programme is far from being randomly assigned. The main
challenge is that participation in JobsPlus is contingent on receiving a job offer, and eligible individuals who
receive a job offer are not a random sample of the pool of long-term unemployed. One possible way to solve
this selection problem is to isolate, among eligible non-participants, a subset of individuals who would have had,
on average, the same probability of getting a job as treated individuals, had the subsidy not been in place.
5If the treatment is randomly assigned the equation for the ATT reduces to E[Y t+hi (1)|Wi = 1]− E[Y
t+h
i (0)|Wi = 0]
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In the evaluation literature this aspect is commonly referred to as “double selection issue”. As illustrated
by Schünemann et al. (2015), differently from training or job search assistance programmes, wage subsidies
cannot be mandated, since they require the willingness of an employer to hire a subsidised worker.
For policy or programmes consisting of wage subsidies or hiring incentives, the policy-makers can only
provide the option of granting this support, while actual take-up is the outcome of decisions that can only be
influenced to some degree. This depends in the final instance by the fact that an unemployed individual could
find a job in a firm eligible for the subsidy. In practice, in order to be able to benefit from the subsidy (selection
into the treatment), the unemployed person will first have to be selected for the job (selection into employment).
We rely on matching approaches. These allow to deliver estimates of the ATT using matched treated
and controls individuals, on the basis of the unconfoundedness6 assumption. This requires that, given a set of
observable characteristicsX , participation is as good as randomly assigned. Under this assumption, the selection
process that influences participation and potential outcomes is solely based on the observable characteristics in
X :
E[Y t+hi (0)|Wi = 1, X] = E[Y
t+h
i (0)|Wi = 0, X] (2)
The purest matching estimator is the one based on exact matching in which each treated individual is
matched to one or more controls having exactly the same characteristics: if i is a treated unit, j is her match,
and X contains K characterstics, then x1i = x1j , x2i = x2j , ..., x1K = x1K . Intuitively, the credibility of the
unconfoundedness assumption crucially depends on the richness of information set inX . However, the downside
of high dimensionality is that the likelihood of exact matches dramatically decreases with the dimension of X ,
and with the presence of continuous-valued characteristics.
This dimensionality problem can be solved using a balancing score b(X), defined as ‘a function of the
observed covariates X such that the conditional distribution of X given b(X) is the same in the treated and
control units’ by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). They show that if unconfoundedness holds conditioning on X ,
it also holds conditioning on b(X). The most common balancing score is the Propensity Score widely used
in observational studies. Given b(X), matched control units can be chosen using either exact matching, or
nearest-neighbor using a distance measure D in the balancing scores metrics, e.g. the Euclidean distance.7
Once each treated unit is matched with her best control(s), the ATT can be simply estimated with mean
differences between the outcomes observed in the treated and control group.
In this study we estimate the ATT at different points in time after the end of the subsidy. We implement
a combination of exact matching, and nearest-neighbor matching within cells using a long sequence of pre-
treatment unemployment benefits. The nearest-neighbor component of our matching strategy builds on the
work by Barban et al. (2017). As it will be described in the next section, the authors propose an extension of
nearest neighbor matching estimators based on dissimilarities between sequences. These are measured by
means of Optimal Matching Algorithm, a tool commonly used in sequence analysis. The use of this technique,
non-standard in the evaluation literature, allows us to fully exploit the entire structure of pre-treatment individual
trajectories.
7.3 Sequence Analysis and Optimal Matching Algorithm
The Optimal Matching Algorithm (OMA hereafter) method can be used to measure the dissimilarity between two
different sequences. From a pure methodological perspective, an individual sequence is a string containing a
finite number of characters, each representing the ‘state’ of an individual in a given moment in time. The OMA
standard approach is used in sequence analysis, a stream of the sociological literature dealing with life-course
studies in which the sequence, conceived as the representation of a longitudinal process by a series of states,
is the object of primary interest.
To define a sequence two main elements are needed: i) the sequence length and its spacing (for instance,
a 24-month monthly sequence); ii) the so-called state-space, i.e. a full list of states of the world mutually
exclusive in time. In the OMA the distance between two sequences is defined as the cost associated to the edit
operations required to transform the original sequences and make them identical. There are two separate types
of edit operations that can be performed on sequences in the OMA framework: i) insertion/deletion operations
in which a state is inserted or deleted in a specific portion of the sequence; ii) substitution operations in which
a state is replaced by another. In order to derive a distance metric, specific costs must be assigned to each
type of operation. This choice is generally justified on theoretical and empirical grounds and heavily depends
6Or, alternatively, selection on observables, conditional independence, ignorable treatment assignment.
7Another common way to use balancing scores is to weight observations using functions of b(X), typically kernel functions.
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on the object of study. The method, originally developed in the field of information theory, was introduced in
sequence analysis by Abbott (1995). In the context of sequence analysis, the distance is commonly used to
group sequences into clusters based on their similarity, and identify patterns of life-course trajectories.
Barban et al. (2017) are the first to combine sequence analysis techniques with causal inference in an
observational study. They propose a new matching approach to investigate the effect of the age at retirement
on subsequent health outcomes. More specifically, they develop a nearest-neighbor matching estimator based
on OM-computed distances using pre-retirement health trajectories. The core idea is that the entire structure
of the pre-treatment (pre-retirement) trajectory, including the timing and sequencing of states, is informative
about the decision to retire at a specific age, hence it provides a better way to mitigate issues of self-selection
into the treatment.
The empirical approach in this analysis builds on the one proposed by Barban et al. (2017). More specifically,
we match JobsPlus participants with eligible non-participants by means of exact matching and OMA, using
their pre-JobsPlus sequence of unemployment-related benefits. We use this information also to identify the
month of entry in eligibility. This is based on having received unemployment benefits i) for at least 12 months
in the previous 18months (e7,500 grant), or ii) for at least 24months in the previous 30months (e10,000 grant).
Since eligible non-participants have, by definition, no JobsPlus starting date, this type of information cannot
be used to match individuals. Hence, we first group all individuals in the sample (of treated and potential con-
trols) in cells defined by the month in which they become eligible for the subsidy. We select only those potential
controls who enter the eligibility condition (separately for the two treatments) in a month corresponding to the
entry of at least one treated individual.
Having constructed cells of treated and control units in this way, in each cell there might be more than one
treated unit, with potentially different JobsPlus starting date. Suppose that in cell c there are N treated units
with K(< N) different JobsPlus starting dates. We create K ‘copies’ of each non-participant, and assign to
each copy the Kth starting date.8 Importantly, creating K copies of non-participants ensures that sampling of
control units is done with replacement. This allows that in each cell each treated unit will have a match, i.e. a
control unit with the samemonth of entry in the eligibility condition and the same imputed JobsPlus starting date.
Once each unit in the sample has a JobsPlus starting date, we construct individual sequences representing
monthly individuals’ trajectories in the 48 months before the beginning of JobsPlus. The same information
used to compute eligibility is used to define mutually exclusive states: each month individual i can either
receive or not receive unemployment related benefits. This binary classification produces sequences of the type
’...0000001111001...’, and mirrors the distinction between Live Register and non-Live Register episodes.
Receiving or not unemployment benefits is, therefore, the main information our matching approach builds
on. Since individuals on unemployment related benefits are allowed to work, embedding this information too
would provide a better characterization of the past working history of individuals. Unfortunately, information on
earnings and weeks worked is only available on annual basis, and employment spells are imprecisely recorded
in the original database.9 To circumvent this issue, we exploit the information available on the annual number
of weeks worked in the 4 years preceding the beginning of JobsPlus, and perform an exact match before
applying OM. More specifically, we first classify the number of weeks worked each year in a 4-class category:
wksit−j = {0, 1 − 26, 27 − 51, 52}.10 We then match exactly participants and non-participants within cells
defined by: i) month of entry in eligibility; ii) JobsPlus starting month; iii) wksit−j for each j in {1, 2, 3, 4}.
Finally, we perform the OMA within these same cells. We set substitution cost to 1 and insert/delete cost
to 2.11 Each treated unit is matched with the control units having the closest sequence, i.e. the sequence with
the lowest overall cost of transformation. Denote with i the generic treated unit, and with j the generic control
8This is different from what has been done in other studies based on matching estimators where non-participants are given a random
starting date.
9Start/end dates do not provide an accurate representation of the true spell, and, more importantly, entire spells might be not recorded.
See the following section on data limitations for more details.
10This classification is driven by the fact that the empirical distribution of weeks worked is bimodal with mass points at 0 and 52, and
an almost-uniform distribution in the middle.
11This choice is driven by a number of reasons. We only consider two mutually exclusive states, hence any data-driven substitution
cost (as suggested by Piccarreta and Billari, 2007) would produce the same result. What really matters in our analysis is the relative cost
between the two types of operations. Since the analysed sequences are of equal length, and by construction all eligible non-participants
exhibit both states in their sequences, we follow the advice in Aisenbrey and Fasang (2010) and assign a high cost to indel operations
compared to substitutions. We performed several sensitivity checks using alternative cost schemes. The results are virtually identical. This
is most likely due to the simple state-space definition, and the fact that both treated and controls exhibit by construction both states in
some portions of their sequences.
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unit matched with i using the proposed matching approach. If i is matched with more than one control unit, it
implies that there are Ni individuals with the same closest sequence. The ATT measured h months after the
beginning of JobsPlus is computed as:
1
NT
∑
i∈W=1
[wi · yt+h1,i −
∑
j
wi,j · yt+h0,j ] (3)
In the above formula Nt is the total number of treated units, yt+h1,i and y
t+h
0,j are, respectively, the outcome
of the treated unit i measured h months after the beginning of JobsPlus, and the outcome of the matched
control j . wi = 1/Di is the weight of unit i, and is an inverse function of the distance between her sequence
and that of the matched controls. wi,j = 1/(Ni ·Di) is the weight of j and also takes into account the fact the
Ni controls are matched with unit i.
Three different outcomes are considered in the analysis. The first, measured on a monthly basis, is the
probability of receiving unemployment related benefits. The other two are annual measures of the number
of weeks worked and earnings from employment. All outcomes are measured starting from the first month
of JobsPlus. The effect induced by JobsPlus on these outcome variables can be evaluated at the end of the
programme, i.e. after the 24 months of JobsPlus duration.
8 Results
In this section the main results of the analysis are presented separately for the two treatment types: e7,500
grant for the 12/18 months eligibility group and e10,000 grant for the 24/30 group, and for the three outcomes
considered: the probability of receiving unemployment-related benefits measured on monthly basis, annual
weeks worked and annual earnings.
The unmatched control sample
The first evidence below in Figure 12 shows the results obtained using the unmatched sample. More specifically,
the control group corresponds to the entire set of non-participants who enter the eligibility condition in a month
equal to at least one treated unit. As such, the control group is already selected over one of the dimensions
entering the matching design explained earlier. Importantly, controls are not matched using the set of pre-
treatment outcomes.
Figures suggest that treated and non-treated individuals with a similar unemployment continuity exhibit a
different trend in the probability of being on the Live Register before and after JobsPlus. It is interesting to
highlight that this is even more marked for those longer-term unemployed. In both panels of Figure 12 there is
a decrease in the y variable in proximity to a JobsPlus start.
These differences indicate that treated and controls are not comparable directly, because they might differ
for some characteristics in addition to JobsPlus participation. The matching procedure helps to cope with this
issue by identifying a proper control group for treated individuals, accounting for some observable characteristics.
8.1 Overall results
The average difference between individuals who benefited of the JobsPlus 12/18 treatment and the respective
controls on the probability of receiving unemployment-related benefits is plotted in Figure 13. The horizontal
axis represents the distance in months from the JobsPlus starting date. It is worth highlighting that individuals
treated by JobsPlus are less likely to be back on the Live Register in the 24 months after the commencement
of the programme. The three lines distinguish between those observed only for 24 months after JobsPlus
start(solid line), those observed for 36 months (dashed line) and those observed for 48 months (dotted line).
Overall, results show that the differences tend to decrease over time, even though a statistically significant
effect is still found after 48 months. Interestingly, the result is similar also for the 24/30 treatment, as shown in
Figure 14, albeit less marked. Moreover, for those individuals that were long-term unemployed the lines appear
steeper, suggesting that the gap in the probability of returning to the Live Register narrows more quickly than
in the other case. In terms of magnitude (Tables 1 and 2), the effect decreases over time and is higher for
those observed for four years. On average, two years after the JobsPlus start date, treated individuals (JobsPlus
24/30) have a lower probability to be on the Live Register of about 0.21 percentage points respect to their
matched controls. The effect is similar for those receiving JobsPlus 12/18, but the reduction over time is less
pronounced.
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Figure 12: Average difference between treated and controls in the probability of receiving unemployment-related benefits.
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The x axis represents the monthly timeline centered on the beginning of JobsPlus. The left panel refers to the treatment 12/18, the right
panel to the treatment 24/30. The solid, dashed, and dotted lines refer to individuals observable for, respectively, 24-35, 36-47, and more
than 48 months after the beginning of JobsPlus
Table 1: Average difference between treated and controls in the probability of receiving unemployment-related benefits:
12/18 group
1y. after JP-start 2y. after JP-start 3y. after JP-start 4y. after JP-start
ys avail. N treated T C Diff. T C Diff. T C Diff. T C Diff.
2 846 .075 .366 -.292*** .098 .282 -.184***
3 980 .059 .354 -.294*** .094 .29 -.196*** .086 .234 -.148***
4 696 .076 .419 -.343*** .084 .346 -.262*** .093 .259 -.166*** .085 .196 -.111***
Notes: The results are presented separately for individuals whose trajectory can be observed for 2,3, and 4 years after the beginning
of JobsPlus (column 1 in the table). T and C indicate, respectively, Treated and Controls.
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level,respectively.
Table 2: Average difference between treated and controls in the probability of receiving unemployment-related benefits:
24/30 group
1y. after JP-start 2y. after JP-start 3y. after JP-start 4y. after JP-start
ys avail. N treated T C Diff. T C Diff. T C Diff. T C Diff.
2 2257 .111 .429 -.318*** .132 .348 -.216***
3 1964 .135 .427 -.291*** .144 .357 -.213*** .125 .292 -.167***
4 1181 .15 .527 -.377*** .181 .451 -.27*** .161 .36 -.199*** .129 .293 -.164***
Notes: The results are presented separately for individuals whose trajectory can be observed for 2,3, and 4 years after the beginning
of JobsPlus (column 1 in the table). T and C indicate, respectively, Treated and Controls.
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level,respectively.
Analogously, Figures 15 and 16 and Tables 3 and 4 show the average difference between treated and controls
in terms of weeks worked. In this case, the time elapsed since JobsPlus start is expressed in years due to a
different structure of the dataset. Once more, the difference is greater for those receiving the treatment 24/30.
The effect is decreasing over time and it is higher for those that are observed up to four years after JobsPlus
start. For the latter, the difference ranges from a maximum of 22 weeks one year after JobsPlus start, to a
minimum of 13 weeks three years after.
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Figure 13: Average difference between treated and controls in the probability of receiving unemployment-related benefits:
24/30 group.
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The x axis represents the monthly timeline centered on the beginning of JobsPlus.The solid, dashed, and dotted lines refer to individuals
observable for, respectively, 24-35, 36-47, and more than 48 months after the beginning of JobsPlus.
Figure 15: Average difference between treated and controls in the number of annual weeks worked: 12/18 group.
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Note: The x axis represents the yearly timeline centered on the beginning of JobsPlus.
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Figure 14: Average difference between treated and controls in the probability of receiving unemployment-related benefits:
24/30 group.
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The x axis represents the monthly timeline centered on the beginning of JobsPlus.The solid, dashed, and dotted lines refer to individuals
observable for, respectively, 24-35, 36-47, and more than 48 months after the beginning of JobsPlus.
Figure 16: Average difference between treated and controls in the number of annual weeks worked: 24/30 group.
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Note: The x axis represents the yearly timeline centered on the beginning of JobsPlus.
Table 3: Average difference between treated and controls in the annual number of weeks worked: 12/18 group
1y. after JP-start 2y. after JP-start 3y. after JP-start 4y. after JP-start
ys avail. N treated T C Diff. T C Diff. T C Diff. T C Diff.
1 311 42.896 25.711 17.186***
2 835 45.526 26.781 18.745*** 41.095 27.54 13.554***
3 1030 46.566 26.162 20.404*** 44.198 28.726 15.472*** 42.382 28.477 13.906***
4 346 46.533 23.97 22.563*** 44.639 26.821 17.818*** 42.499 29.307 13.191*** 42.174 27.833 14.34***
Notes: The results are presented separately for individuals whose trajectory can be observed for 1,2,3, and 4 years after the beginning of JobsPlus (column 1 in
the table). T and C indicate, respectively, Treated and Controls.
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level,respectively.
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Table 4: Average difference between treated and controls in the annual number of weeks worked: 24/30 group
1y. after JP-start 2y. after JP-start 3y. after JP-start 4y. after JP-start
ys avail. N treated T C Diff. T C Diff. T C Diff. T C Diff.
1 946 42.815 22.354 20.46***
2 1984 44.854 23.142 21.713*** 41.586 22.569 19.017***
3 1888 43.804 21.707 22.097*** 42.104 24.048 18.056*** 39.922 23.127 16.795***
4 584 43.974 18.366 25.607*** 41.487 20.802 20.685*** 40.676 23.666 17.01*** 39.681 23.008 16.673***
Notes: The results are presented separately for individuals whose trajectory can be observed for 1,2,3, and 4 years after the beginning of JobsPlus (column 1 in the
table). T and C indicate, respectively, Treated and Controls.
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level,respectively.
Reassuringly, the previous findings are also confirmed when the effect is assessed in terms of earnings from
employment. Figures 17 and 18 show that treated individuals exhibit higher earnings from employment with
respect to the controls after the inception of JobsPlus. This is confirmed for both types of JobsPlus treatments
and, as showed in tables 5 and 6, it is higher for those receiving the 24/30 subsidy.
Namely, a long-term unemployed person who has been on the Live Register for at least 24 months in the
past 30 months and enters JobsPlus with the larger subsidy, could benefit, three years after she has started the
programme, of earnings on average higher of about e10700 with respect to her controls.
Figure 17: Average difference between treated and controls in the number of annual earnings: 12/18 group.
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Note: The x axis represents the yearly timeline centered on the beginning of JobsPlus.
Figure 18: Average difference between treated and controls in the number of annual earnings: 24/30 group.
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Note: The x axis represents the yearly timeline centered on the beginning of JobsPlus.
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Table 5: Average difference between treated and controls in annual earnings: 12/18 group
1y. after JP-start 2y. after JP-start 3y. after JP-start 4y. after JP-start
ys avail. N treated T C Diff. T C Diff. T C Diff. T C Diff.
1 311 22682.58 18594.63 4087.955**
2 835 21529.17 17811.59 3717.58*** 23528.56 20133.66 3394.904***
3 1030 22176.45 17423.7 4752.755*** 24283.88 19654.34 4629.544*** 26139.76 22132.72 4007.045***
4 346 21837.9 14921.35 6916.554*** 23669.68 17671.63 5998.052*** 25844.31 19953.93 5890.383*** 28267.31 22181.71 6085.606***
Notes: The results are presented separately for individuals whose trajectory can be observed for 1,2,3, and 4 years after the beginning of JobsPlus (column 1 in the table). T and C indicate,
respectively, Treated and Controls.
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level,respectively.
Table 6: Average difference between treated and controls in annual earnings: 24/30 group
1y. after JP-start 2y. after JP-start 3y. after JP-start 4y. after JP-start
ys avail. N treated T C Diff. T C Diff. T C Diff. T C Diff.
1 946 21400.66 17212.69 4187.975***
2 1984 21304.3 16106.98 5197.325*** 22730.15 18359.32 4370.831***
3 1888 21534.63 15331.01 6203.613*** 23449.29 17534.02 5915.273*** 25195.08 19600.26 5594.82***
4 584 20174.15 12618.47 7555.674*** 22271.65 14971.44 7300.208*** 23997.78 17656.85 6340.933*** 25825.74 20033.13 5792.613***
Notes: The results are presented separately for individuals whose trajectory can be observed for 1,2,3, and 4 years after the beginning of JobsPlus (column 1 in the table). T and C indicate,
respectively, Treated and Controls.
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level,respectively.
To sum up, workers under JobsPlus are less likely to claim unemployment benefits after the conclusion of the
programme. This effect is even bigger for those individuals that had been unemployed for a longer period when
they started the programme. These findings are corroborated by a positive difference in terms of weeks worked
and income.
8.2 Results by cohort: age and income
In order to investigate whether the effect is heterogeneous according to some additional characteristics, the
previous analyses were run separately for different cohorts of individuals, defined on the basis of age classes
and previous income quartiles.
Heterogeneity by age
Treated individuals are grouped into five age classes (25-, 26-35, 36-45, 46-55,55+ )12. The following tables
present the effect of JobsPlus disaggregated by age class, on each of the three outcomes, and for the two
JobsPlus treatments. The number of the treated units per class decreases with age and is smaller for the 12/18
treatment group. Tables 7, 9 and 11 refer to JobsPlus 12/18 treatment, while Tables 8, 10 and 12 show the
results for JobsPlus 24/30.
In terms of probability to be in unemployment-related benefit recipiency (Tables 7 and 8), results show
that the difference decreases over time for both JobsPlus 12/18 and JobsPlus 24/30 both in magnitude and
significance, independently by the age of the treated units in the class. When looking at the age classes, results
show that the difference tends to be higher for those in the 26-35 class and in particular for the individuals
observed for four years after the inception of JobsPlus 12/18 treatment. The picture is slightly different for the
long-term unemployed who receive the JobsPlus 24/30 treatment. In this case the difference is bigger for older
people (55+, albeit the sample size of the class is smaller).
As far as the number of weeks worked in a year is concerned, Tables 9 and 10 confirm that the effect sharply
declines over time, especially for those aged 26-35 years for both types of treatment. Those aged 26-45
benefited the most in terms of weeks worked from JobsPlus 12/18, while those aged under 25 benefited the
most from JobsPlus 24/30.
12Cells with less than 20 individuals were dropped. The controls are assigned to the age class of their respective treated unit.
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Table 7: Treatment 12/18. Average difference between treated and controls in the probability of receiving unemployment-
related benefits. Heterogeneity by age
1y. after JP-start 2y. after JP-start 3y. after JP-start 4y. after JP-start
category ys avail. N treated T C Diff. T C Diff. T C Diff. T C Diff.
25- 2 248 .071 .364 -.293*** .089 .296 -.207***
25- 3 284 .076 .332 -.256*** .099 .265 -.166*** .102 .218 -.116**
25- 4 218 .074 .468 -.394*** .097 .367 -.27*** .103 .283 -.18*** .091 .204 -.113**
26-35 2 301 .071 .381 -.31*** .102 .286 -.184***
26-35 3 418 .053 .397 -.344*** .086 .328 -.242*** .074 .257 -.183***
26-35 4 255 .054 .432 -.378*** .056 .381 -.325*** .067 .277 -.21*** .088 .211 -.123**
36-45 2 178 .074 .358 -.283*** .067 .245 -.178***
36-45 3 182 .037 .31 -.273*** .114 .275 -.162** .062 .211 -.148**
36-45 4 132 .068 .341 -.273*** .063 .281 -.219*** .051 .221 -.17*** .044 .177 -.133**
46-55 2 94 .113 .356 -.243** .158 .29 -.131*
46-55 3 73 .053 .304 -.252** .006 .233 -.227*** .058 .204 -.146**
46-55 4 74 .128 .344 -.216** .145 .271 -.126 .178 .182 -.005 .099 .157 -.059
55+ 2 25 .019 .314 -.295** .107 .267 -.159
55+ 3 23 .132 .446 -.314** .273 .308 -.035 .307 .334 -.026
55+ 4
Notes: The results are presented separately for individuals whose trajectory can be observed for 2,3, and 4 years after the beginning of JobsPlus
(column 2 in the table). T and C indicate, respectively, Treated and Controls.
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level,respectively.
Table 8: Treatment 24/30. Average difference between treated and controls in the probability of receiving unemployment-
related benefits. Heterogeneity by age
1y. after JP-start 2y. after JP-start 3y. after JP-start 4y. after JP-start
category ys avail. N treated T C Diff. T C Diff. T C Diff. T C Diff.
25- 2 329 .115 .404 -.289*** .115 .328 -.212***
25- 3 282 .106 .412 -.306*** .14 .342 -.202*** .151 .268 -.117**
25- 4 168 .147 .6 -.453*** .148 .496 -.348*** .136 .368 -.232*** .136 .301 -.165**
26-35 2 880 .116 .409 -.292*** .13 .342 -.212***
26-35 3 852 .15 .422 -.272*** .153 .357 -.205*** .109 .3 -.191***
26-35 4 524 .154 .525 -.371*** .181 .457 -.276*** .148 .37 -.222*** .13 .303 -.174***
36-45 2 610 .105 .445 -.34*** .121 .356 -.235***
36-45 3 494 .139 .424 -.285*** .137 .354 -.217*** .12 .293 -.173***
36-45 4 280 .123 .514 -.39*** .164 .43 -.266*** .164 .342 -.177*** .131 .279 -.149***
46-55 2 331 .078 .469 -.391*** .136 .367 -.231***
46-55 3 262 .126 .44 -.313*** .138 .36 -.221*** .169 .286 -.117**
46-55 4 163 .197 .473 -.276*** .245 .415 -.17** .224 .34 -.116** .124 .268 -.145**
55+ 2 107 .198 .449 -.25*** .238 .341 -.102
55+ 3 74 .081 .508 -.427*** .117 .407 -.29*** .09 .304 -.215**
55+ 4 46 .09 .57 -.481*** .174 .484 -.31** .133 .401 -.268** .11 .336 -.226**
Notes: The results are presented separately for individuals whose trajectory can be observed for 2,3, and 4 years after the beginning of JobsPlus
(column 2 in the table). T and C indicate, respectively, Treated and Controls.
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level,respectively.
Table 9: Treatment 12/18. Average difference between treated and controls in annual number of weeks worked.
Heterogeneity by age
1y. after JP-start 2y. after JP-start 3y. after JP-start 4y. after JP-start
category ys avail. N treated T C Diff. T C Diff. T C Diff. T C Diff.
25- 1 78 38.525 23.052 15.473***
25- 2 246 44.056 24.321 19.735*** 38.853 25.133 13.72***
25- 3 311 44.544 23.834 20.711*** 43.663 25.864 17.799*** 41.538 25.799 15.739***
25- 4 115 46.547 19.978 26.569*** 44.772 23.432 21.339*** 41.422 25.254 16.168*** 42.486 23.432 19.055***
26-35 1 124 42.28 24.484 17.796***
26-35 2 312 46.684 27.337 19.348*** 42.143 28.539 13.604***
26-35 3 412 47.471 24.816 22.655*** 44.137 28.218 15.919*** 41.596 27.9 13.696***
26-35 4 126 45.564 23.413 22.151*** 43.684 26.089 17.595*** 40.05 29.206 10.844** 39.018 27.993 11.025**
36-45 1 69 48.457 28.426 20.031***
36-45 2 172 45.704 28.826 16.878*** 41.677 28.313 13.365***
36-45 3 192 48.815 30.46 18.355*** 46.452 32.689 13.762*** 47.025 31.459 15.565***
36-45 4 59 47.384 26.801 20.583*** 45.771 29.13 16.641*** 47.703 31.456 16.247*** 46.11 30.653 15.458***
46-55 1 34 47.822 32.363 15.459**
46-55 2 79 44.281 30.16 14.12*** 41.97 31.738 10.232**
46-55 3 91 48.533 29.755 18.777*** 46.44 31.877 14.563*** 43.002 33.828 9.174**
46-55 4 37 46.996 29.469 17.527*** 44.765 31.887 12.878** 47.851 35.054 12.797** 47.27 32.908 14.362**
55+ 1
55+ 2 26 51.516 24.464 27.052*** 47.727 25.655 22.072***
55+ 3 24 37.818 31.504 6.314 28.068 33.67 -5.602 28.516 31.394 -2.878
55+ 4
Notes: The results are presented separately for individuals whose trajectory can be observed for 2,3, and 4 years after the beginning of JobsPlus (column 2 in the table). T and
C indicate, respectively, Treated and Controls.
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level,respectively.
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Table 10: Treatment 24/30. Average difference between treated and controls in annual number of weeks worked.
Heterogeneity by age
1y. after JP-start 2y. after JP-start 3y. after JP-start 4y. after JP-start
category ys avail. N treated T C Diff. T C Diff. T C Diff. T C Diff.
25- 1 108 41.894 20.19 21.704***
25- 2 306 43.83 21.316 22.514*** 39.688 21.456 18.232***
25- 3 274 44 18.518 25.481*** 40.589 21.602 18.987*** 37.663 21.742 15.92***
25- 4 91 44.291 16.465 27.826*** 40.817 19.862 20.954*** 39.94 22.802 17.138*** 39.619 22.064 17.555***
26-35 1 368 43.296 22.798 20.498***
26-35 2 804 44.574 22.927 21.647*** 40.985 22.676 18.309***
26-35 3 831 43.96 21.509 22.451*** 42.543 23.836 18.707*** 40.686 23.093 17.592***
26-35 4 253 44.354 16.975 27.379*** 41.244 19.368 21.876*** 40.998 22.311 18.687*** 38.463 21.919 16.544***
36-45 1 273 43.538 22.225 21.313***
36-45 2 504 44.754 23.231 21.523*** 42.471 22.501 19.97***
36-45 3 464 44.011 21.626 22.385*** 43.535 23.854 19.682*** 41.223 22.489 18.734***
36-45 4 143 44 20.302 23.698*** 42.598 22.444 20.154*** 40.257 25.861 14.396*** 40.008 23.839 16.169***
46-55 1 145 41.774 22.341 19.433***
46-55 2 280 47.062 24.98 22.082*** 44.211 23.63 20.581***
46-55 3 256 43.093 24.997 18.096*** 40.437 26.411 14.027*** 38.398 25.328 13.07***
46-55 4 75 41.844 20.609 21.234*** 39.333 21.958 17.374*** 40.269 23.584 16.685*** 43.258 24.427 18.831***
55+ 1 52 40.01 23.696 16.315***
55+ 2 90 43.884 24.414 19.47*** 39.174 22.055 17.119***
55+ 3 63 42.264 24.471 17.793*** 38.359 28.732 9.627* 35.281 25.037 10.244**
55+ 4 22 46.176 22.335 23.841** 48.933 27.526 21.407** 44.917 30.033 14.883* 38.735 30.141 8.594
Notes: The results are presented separately for individuals whose trajectory can be observed for 2,3, and 4 years after the beginning of JobsPlus (column 2 in the table). T and
C indicate, respectively, Treated and Controls.
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level,respectively.
Tables 11 and 12 present the JobsPlus estimated impact on earnings from employment. Here, the effect is less
clear than in the previous cases as the decreasing pattern over time is not confirmed. In terms of magnitude,
three years after JobsPlus start, the effect is higher for those aged 36-45 under JobsPlus 12/18 and ranges
between e10,000 and 15,000 for those who are observed for three or four years, respectively. Differently, for
those under JobsPlus 24/30, there is a difference of about e12,000 for those included in the sample for three
years and e11,000 for those observed for four years. This suggests that the positive effect on earnings is more
persistent over time, especially for younger individuals (under 35 years).
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Table 11: Treatment 12/18. Average difference between treated and controls in annual earnings. Heterogeneity by age
1y. after JP-start 2y. after JP-start 3y. after JP-start 4y. after JP-start
category ys avail. N treated T C Diff. T C Diff. T C Diff. T C Diff.
25- 1 78 17467.74 15484.55 1983.189
25- 2 246 17918.9 15136.38 2782.517** 19710.89 18013.46 1697.431
25- 3 311 18818.33 13918.03 4900.3*** 21914.6 16697.22 5217.377*** 23370.59 18892.03 4478.558**
25- 4 115 18395.62 12560.2 5835.422*** 20486.88 15858.25 4628.627** 22080.3 18346.78 3733.52* 25309.84 20407 4902.835**
26-35 1 124 23250.89 17620.22 5630.67**
26-35 2 312 22690.16 18473.25 4216.915** 25686.45 20327.32 5359.136**
26-35 3 412 22574.54 16893.63 5680.903*** 23975.37 19199.87 4775.499*** 26589.68 21917.73 4671.951**
26-35 4 126 21594.71 14207.24 7387.479*** 23845.69 16693.94 7151.747*** 25656.48 19195.86 6460.621** 29469.99 22076.22 7393.766**
36-45 1 69 27904.94 21765.81 6139.124
36-45 2 172 23749.66 19511.63 4238.025** 25205.62 21993.35 3212.272
36-45 3 192 26137.77 21591.83 4545.939* 28322.9 22984.69 5338.212* 29646.29 24666.51 4979.79
36-45 4 59 25875.78 16259.6 9616.182** 27545.46 18761.82 8783.64** 31366.63 19969.76 11396.87** 32267.54 22399.66 9867.885**
46-55 1 34 25480.82 23683.3 1797.522
46-55 2 79 23128.34 20813.91 2314.43 24586.59 22952.73 1633.858
46-55 3 91 25638.19 23280.61 2357.576 25622.38 24311.57 1310.813 27920.88 28832.7 -911.814
46-55 4 37 23758.36 18759.95 4998.403 25966.76 21787.32 4179.445 27625.95 24322.5 3303.446 29024.07 24957.09 4066.979
55+ 1
55+ 2 26 28657.54 18017.38 10640.16** 26656.25 18501.29 8154.959
55+ 3 24 18837.68 15041.88 3795.794 23903.14 18416.96 5486.176 22945.1 20502.63 2442.46
55+ 4
Notes: The results are presented separately for individuals whose trajectory can be observed for 2,3, and 4 years after the beginning of JobsPlus (column 2 in the table). T and C indicate, respectively, Treated
and Controls.
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level,respectively.
29
Table 12: Treatment 24/30. Average difference between treated and controls in annual earnings. Heterogeneity by age
1y. after JP-start 2y. after JP-start 3y. after JP-start 4y. after JP-start
category ys avail. N treated T C Diff. T C Diff. T C Diff. T C Diff.
25- 1 108 18636.17 16113.54 2522.634
25- 2 306 17489.54 15143.86 2345.686** 18792.57 17720.11 1072.466
25- 3 274 17423.44 14148.33 3275.106 18316.95 15910.89 2406.064* 19621.88 18881.36 740.517
25- 4 91 16365.15 10398.2 5966.952*** 17287.62 13646.14 3641.476* 18815.71 17576.17 1239.541 21286.85 19256.51 2030.332
26-35 1 368 20684.89 17559.81 3125.083**
26-35 2 804 20901.91 15823.84 5078.065*** 22607.2 18628.3 3978.904***
26-35 3 831 21381.26 15735.86 5645.395*** 23579.21 17699.63 5879.574*** 25403.46 19882.78 5520.675***
26-35 4 253 20323.78 12243.49 8080.292*** 22390.02 14426.36 7963.661*** 24863.66 16447.17 8416.488*** 26170.79 18992.44 7178.349***
36-45 1 273 22313.53 17548.12 4765.408***
36-45 2 504 22363.42 16907.08 5456.338*** 24115.28 18416.59 5698.682***
36-45 3 464 22776.24 14828.96 7947.282*** 25383.88 17649.69 7734.194*** 27184.32 19405.56 7778.759***
36-45 4 143 21354.23 13104.84 8249.387*** 25515.15 15026.91 10488.24*** 26206.03 18658.52 7547.516** 27366.99 20964.79 6402.21**
46-55 1 145 22104.11 15688.01 6416.105***
46-55 2 280 23939.85 16085.62 7854.233*** 25154.54 17870.02 7284.512***
46-55 3 256 23577.05 16012.46 7564.59*** 24455.45 18498.55 5956.904*** 26286.97 20300.03 5986.947***
46-55 4 75 22082.62 14604.27 7478.353** 22933.91 15748.15 7185.757** 24592.5 18145.87 6446.628** 29877.63 20498.19 9379.442**
55+ 1 52 24368.87 18767.93 5600.935
55+ 2 90 22181.22 17052.86 5128.359** 19618.44 19342.24 276.204
55+ 3 63 22751.35 15289.08 7462.273** 23893.97 16729.55 7164.417** 25617.48 17260.94 8356.533**
55+ 4 22 20119.73 14941.86 5177.865 18396.4 22901.88 -4505.478 18917.99 23173.65 -4255.655 15493.31 27382.78 -11889.47*
Notes: The results are presented separately for individuals whose trajectory can be observed for 2,3, and 4 years after the beginning of JobsPlus (column 2 in the table). T and C indicate, respectively, Treated
and Controls.
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level,respectively.
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Heterogeneity by previous income
Heterogeneity by income is assessed by considering quartiles of earnings from employment for the three calendar
years preceding a JobsPlus start (or imputed start). Tables 13 and 14 show the results on the probability of
receiving unemployment-related benefits. For JobsPlus 12/18, the higher was the previous income, the lower
is the probability of receiving unemployment-related benefits. The effect is on average higher for the JobsPlus
24/30 and declines over time. The maximum difference is registered one year after JobsPlus starts, for those
in the first quartile under JobsPlus 12/18 and one year after for those in the fourth quartile under JobsPlus
24/30. In both cases this effect refers to individuals observed for 4 years. The fact that the differential effect of
JobsPlus across the income distribution varies by JobsPlus treatments might be related to the different amounts
of subsidies received.
Table 13: Treatment 12/18. Average difference between treated and controls in the probability of receiving unemployment-
related benefits. Heterogeneity by previous income
1y. after JP-start 2y. after JP-start 3y. after JP-start 4y. after JP-start
category ys avail. N treated T C Diff. T C Diff. T C Diff. T C Diff.
1st 2 182 .077 .39 -.313*** .111 .305 -.195***
1st 3 195 .089 .381 -.291*** .088 .334 -.246*** .122 .273 -.151***
1st 4 111 .066 .468 -.403*** .121 .408 -.286*** .115 .322 -.207*** .118 .235 -.116**
2nd 2 221 .071 .339 -.268*** .106 .274 -.168***
2nd 3 262 .039 .385 -.347*** .098 .299 -.201*** .089 .25 -.161***
2nd 4 182 .119 .485 -.366*** .09 .398 -.308*** .099 .275 -.176** .093 .17 -.077
3rd 2 252 .051 .412 -.361*** .079 .323 -.245***
3rd 3 286 .059 .375 -.315*** .096 .295 -.198*** .058 .226 -.167***
3rd 4 196 .057 .434 -.377*** .062 .359 -.297*** .08 .262 -.181*** .077 .213 -.136**
4th 2 191 .096 .322 -.226*** .091 .223 -.132**
4th 3 237 .047 .287 -.24*** .095 .237 -.142*** .069 .189 -.12***
4th 4 207 .065 .335 -.27*** .071 .266 -.195*** .085 .209 -.125** .066 .18 -.114**
Notes: The results are presented separately for individuals whose trajectory can be observed for 2,3, and 4 years after the beginning of JobsPlus
(column 2 in the table). T and C indicate, respectively, Treated and Controls.
Categories are defined according to the quantile of the distribution: less than 629, between 629 and 5244, between 5244 and 14538, more than
14538.
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level,respectively.
Table 14: Treatment 24/30. Average difference between treated and controls in the probability of receiving unemployment-
related benefits. Heterogeneity by previous income
1y. after JP-start 2y. after JP-start 3y. after JP-start 4y. after JP-start
category ys avail. N treated T C Diff. T C Diff. T C Diff. T C Diff.
1st 2 600 .11 .401 -.292*** .127 .338 -.211***
1st 3 529 .133 .377 -.244*** .152 .336 -.184*** .141 .282 -.141***
1st 4 245 .172 .529 -.356*** .208 .463 -.255*** .209 .384 -.175*** .156 .316 -.16***
2nd 2 847 .113 .438 -.325*** .134 .356 -.222***
2nd 3 723 .153 .45 -.297*** .15 .363 -.213*** .112 .296 -.184***
2nd 4 425 .151 .527 -.376*** .194 .456 -.262*** .159 .359 -.2*** .135 .296 -.162***
3rd 2 606 .116 .456 -.34*** .14 .352 -.211***
3rd 3 505 .115 .493 -.378*** .124 .395 -.271*** .112 .314 -.202***
3rd 4 314 .154 .535 -.381*** .166 .443 -.278*** .137 .355 -.218*** .115 .289 -.174***
4th 2 204 .099 .443 -.344*** .119 .341 -.222***
4th 3 207 .123 .398 -.275*** .128 .332 -.204*** .137 .269 -.132**
4th 4 197 .095 .512 -.417*** .12 .425 -.305*** .104 .318 -.214*** .083 .246 -.163***
Notes: The results are presented separately for individuals whose trajectory can be observed for 2,3, and 4 years after the beginning of JobsPlus
(column 2 in the table). T and C indicate, respectively, Treated and Controls.
Categories are defined according to the quantile of the distribution: no income, less than 2600, between 2600 and 8543, more than 8543.
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level,respectively.
Tables 15 and 16 show the difference in terms of weeks worked. This evidence is consistent with the diachronic
declining pattern presented in the previous tables, but the difference is higher for those in the first quartile of
income for both JobsPlus 12/18 and JobsPlus 24/32. The effect (29 weeks) is higher for JobsPlus 24/30 respect
to a difference of 24 weeks for JobsPlus 12/18.
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Table 15: Treatment 12/18. Average difference between treated and controls in annual number of weeks worked.
Heterogeneity by previous income
1y. after JP-start 2y. after JP-start 3y. after JP-start 4y. after JP-start
category ys avail. N treated T C Diff. T C Diff. T C Diff. T C Diff.
1st 1 58 37.659 19.952 17.707***
1st 2 179 44.096 18.326 25.77*** 37.413 19.212 18.202***
1st 3 195 44.99 18.108 26.882*** 42.174 21.121 21.053*** 39.045 21.496 17.549***
1st 4 56 47.08 14.537 32.542*** 45.145 16.031 29.114*** 43.707 18.915 24.792*** 42.578 19.665 22.913***
2nd 1 89 42.102 23.639 18.462***
2nd 2 225 45.066 27.132 17.934*** 40.217 29.466 10.752***
2nd 3 273 44.905 24.34 20.566*** 43.529 26.772 16.757*** 42.401 27.017 15.384***
2nd 4 78 43.562 20.475 23.087*** 42.137 24.03 18.107*** 37.645 26.313 11.332** 39.247 23.459 15.788**
3rd 1 100 43.891 30.446 13.445**
3rd 2 239 46.582 29.492 17.09*** 42.515 30.971 11.545***
3rd 3 314 47.662 27.521 20.141*** 45.51 30.401 15.11*** 44.549 29.652 14.897***
3rd 4 81 45.232 26.528 18.705*** 42.347 28.149 14.198** 40.214 31.727 8.487* 39.08 28.778 10.302*
4th 1 64 48.53 29.545 18.984***
4th 2 192 46.642 33.756 12.887*** 44.818 32.392 12.426***
4th 3 248 48.494 33.86 14.634*** 45.547 35.881 9.666*** 43.686 35.053 8.633***
4th 4 131 48.095 29.071 19.025*** 46.403 32.751 13.652*** 44.96 34.704 10.256*** 44.491 33.347 11.145***
Notes: The results are presented separately for individuals whose trajectory can be observed for 2,3, and 4 years after the beginning of JobsPlus (column 2 in the table). T and
C indicate, respectively, Treated and Controls.
Categories are defined according to the quantile of the distribution: less than 629, between 629 and 5244, between 5244 and 14538, more than 14538.
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level,respectively.
Table 16: Treatment 24/30. Average difference between treated and controls in annual number of weeks worked.
Heterogeneity by previous income
1y. after JP-start 2y. after JP-start 3y. after JP-start 4y. after JP-start
category ys avail. N treated T C Diff. T C Diff. T C Diff. T C Diff.
1st 1 198 40.447 10.115 30.332***
1st 2 533 44.696 15.712 28.985*** 40.886 15.369 25.517***
1st 3 508 43.419 14.842 28.577*** 41.317 16.911 24.406*** 39.187 16.28 22.907***
1st 4 135 42.213 10.675 31.538*** 38.125 12.827 25.299*** 37.431 15.553 21.878*** 36.586 15.679 20.907***
2nd 1 379 43.131 25.121 18.01***
2nd 2 764 44.412 26.062 18.35*** 40.449 25.772 14.677***
2nd 3 671 42.58 24.903 17.677*** 41.803 27.126 14.677*** 39.378 26.511 12.866***
2nd 4 181 43.606 19.487 24.119*** 41.009 22.452 18.557*** 39.353 24.972 14.38*** 37.361 24.209 13.151***
3rd 1 293 44.153 28.78 15.373***
3rd 2 506 44.913 28.396 16.517*** 43.135 27.568 15.566***
3rd 3 481 44.837 25.645 19.193*** 42.665 28.762 13.903*** 40.668 27.512 13.157***
3rd 4 145 44.775 21.159 23.616*** 43.305 22.475 20.83*** 43.833 27.091 16.743*** 43.719 25.81 17.909***
4th 1 76 45.564 31.474 14.09***
4th 2 181 47.568 31.955 15.613*** 46.633 29.55 17.083***
4th 3 228 47.051 28.425 18.626*** 44.737 30.683 14.054*** 42.792 28.4 14.392***
4th 4 123 46.759 26.738 20.02*** 46.056 30.186 15.871*** 44.798 31.679 13.12*** 44.14 30.579 13.561***
Notes: The results are presented separately for individuals whose trajectory can be observed for 2,3, and 4 years after the beginning of JobsPlus (column 2 in the table). T and
C indicate, respectively, Treated and Controls.
Categories are defined according to the quantile of the distribution: no income, less than 2600, between 2600 and 8543, more than 8543.
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level,respectively.
In terms of work-related earnings, results in (Tables 17 and 18) are more ambiguous and it is more challenging
to identify a clear pattern. In particular, in the case of JobsPlus 12/18 the effect declines in magnitude up to
three years after the inception of the programme and increases afterwards for all the previous income quartiles.
Furthermore, the widest difference is found for those treated that were in the first and in the fourth quartiles.
Similar findings are identified for JobsPlus 24/30, although not perfectly overlapping.
These results point to a differential impact of JobsPlus in relation to age and previous income classes: the
programme had a more marked and long-lasting impact on younger participants and on those who previously
had lower earnings from employment.
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Table 17: Treatment 12/18. Average difference between treated and controls in annual earnings. Heterogeneity by previous income
1y. after JP-start 2y. after JP-start 3y. after JP-start 4y. after JP-start
category ys avail. N treated T C Diff. T C Diff. T C Diff. T C Diff.
1st 1 58 18563.89 14026.77 4537.125*
1st 2 179 19259.76 12841.31 6418.448*** 20512.63 15825.34 4687.292**
1st 3 195 19133.2 11755.43 7377.773*** 20943.56 14318.54 6625.024*** 22274.11 16373.32 5900.79***
1st 4 56 19384.1 10134.14 9249.959*** 19344.22 12837.17 6507.042** 22785.42 15607.63 7177.782** 24301.35 18608.07 5693.272*
2nd 1 89 21179.97 15877.16 5302.813*
2nd 2 225 19777.33 15478.35 4298.982** 21044.2 18353.24 2690.967*
2nd 3 273 19843.73 12444.71 7399.023*** 22964.08 15636.55 7327.527*** 24722.36 19154.07 5568.283***
2nd 4 78 18367.09 10520.7 7846.393*** 21132.59 14126.53 7006.061** 21090.76 17393.98 3696.773 26668.53 19991.16 6677.367**
3rd 1 100 23855.66 20400.01 3455.648
3rd 2 239 22471.99 18589.46 3882.532** 24573.43 20309.55 4263.885**
3rd 3 314 22016.05 17305.52 4710.528** 24115.92 19779.11 4336.817** 26881.91 22134.27 4747.642**
3rd 4 81 20054.22 15067.18 4987.035* 22196.63 16649.59 5547.037** 26428.85 19118.72 7310.125** 29518.62 21754.65 7763.972**
4th 1 64 27385.42 23213.46 4171.963
4th 2 192 24752.67 22909.19 1843.487 27807.34 24864.07 2943.263
4th 3 248 26841.27 24520.93 2320.339 28369.47 25684.88 2684.587 30158.88 27938.4 2220.481
4th 4 131 25247.04 18174.72 7072.312*** 27392.7 20832.7 6560.005** 29163.48 22567.72 6595.761** 30402.37 24217.54 6184.833**
Notes: The results are presented separately for individuals whose trajectory can be observed for 2,3, and 4 years after the beginning of JobsPlus (column 2 in the table). T and C indicate, respectively, Treated
and Controls.
Categories are defined according to the quantile of the distribution: less than 629, between 629 and 5244, between 5244 and 14538, more than 14538.
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level,respectively.
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Table 18: Treatment 24/30. Average difference between treated and controls in annual earnings. Heterogeneity by previous income
1y. after JP-start 2y. after JP-start 3y. after JP-start 4y. after JP-start
category ys avail. N treated T C Diff. T C Diff. T C Diff. T C Diff.
1st 1 198 19637.38 13612.17 6025.208***
1st 2 533 20799.74 15215.67 5584.07*** 22102.67 17518.87 4583.799***
1st 3 508 20926.22 14638.36 6287.857*** 22948.45 16712.01 6236.442*** 25118.87 18566.53 6552.337***
1st 4 135 18577.33 11004.29 7573.038*** 20859.13 13101.71 7757.422*** 21357.22 14684.61 6672.612*** 23780.92 17248.46 6532.458**
2nd 1 379 21278.12 17214.25 4063.864***
2nd 2 764 20691.04 15578.28 5112.759*** 21809.38 18121.7 3687.686***
2nd 3 671 20728.28 15420.94 5307.333*** 22699.77 17514.21 5185.554*** 24036.55 19721.58 4314.973***
2nd 4 181 19771.18 11549.43 8221.745*** 21507.25 14502.01 7005.233** 24160.71 17569.65 6591.061** 24540.73 19219.65 5321.079**
3rd 1 293 22786.82 18068.21 4718.605***
3rd 2 506 21913.26 17191.56 4721.7*** 23852.37 19194.49 4657.875***
3rd 3 481 21691.6 14589.4 7102.198*** 23352.32 17222.25 6130.073*** 24634.69 19491.16 5143.53***
3rd 4 145 21249.38 13003.99 8245.385*** 22935.41 13785.73 9149.678*** 24941.89 16837.51 8104.385*** 27951.67 20507.5 7444.17**
4th 1 76 23931.9 20269.13 3662.769
4th 2 181 25063.71 18385.34 6678.364*** 27026.05 19847.82 7178.235**
4th 3 228 25749.87 17781.73 7968.141*** 27523.47 19851.28 7672.193*** 29932.62 21690.38 8242.241***
4th 4 123 22283.96 15297.81 6986.144*** 24965.71 18597.91 6367.792** 26805.7 21876.04 4929.658* 28356.25 23698.9 4657.349
Notes: The results are presented separately for individuals whose trajectory can be observed for 2,3, and 4 years after the beginning of JobsPlus (column 2 in the table). T and C indicate, respectively, Treated
and Controls.
Categories are defined according to the quantile of the distribution: no income, less than 2600, between 2600 and 8543, more than 8543.
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level,respectively.
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8.3 JobsPlus and the Youth Guarantee
The age distribution of those who participated in JobsPlus is outlined in Figure 11. While the number of
participants in the period of the evaluation is approximately 3,000, relatively few of them had less than 12
months unemployment duration when they commenced JobsPlus. Given the scale of take-up under the four-
month eligibility, it is not possible to estimate the difference made by the reduced eligibility threshold (allowing
those under 25 years to be eligible after four months rather than 12). However, the Youth Guarantee eligibility
threshold coincided with the 2015 expansion of the cap to 6,000 in receipt at any one time. Accordingly, it
seems reasonable to assume that the ESF specific funding for the Youth Guarantee has allowed an additional
number of people to participate. Furthermore, the evaluation suggests a reasonably substantial impact of a
programme offered under the Youth Guarantee and one that works across all age ranges. There is indeed no
evidence of a weaker impact for those under 25.
9 Potential policy design modifications
The analysis to this point is based on the initial policy design, which was modified in respect of all employments
commencing after 01 January 2018, with those over 50 years of age attracting the higher amount even for the
shorter qualifying period (12 months out of the previous 18). Those under 50 years but unemployed for longer
durations (three years in the past three and a half years) also attract the higher amount.
This section considers possible policy modifications that can be made to a subsidy of this type, regardless of the
impact estimated by the preceding counterfactual analysis.
With jobs subsidies such as JobsPlus, there is scope for varying three elements:
— eligibility criteria;
— duration of subsidy;
— amount of subsidy.
The subsidy adjusts the employer’s incentive to hire candidates who, all else being equal, are at a disad-
vantage compared to others. After a stark drop in domestic demand (as witnessed in Ireland during the Great
Recession), a large number of people become newly unemployed. Unless a recovery is instantaneous, a share of
these people will cross the threshold into long-term unemployed status. This status is typically used to identify
those at considerable labour market disadvantage but in the aftermath of a recession, many of those with long-
term unemployed status may have good sectoral knowledge, workplace skills, occupational qualifications and
a strong track record of employment. In contrast, after a long period of recovery, those who remain long-term
unemployed are likely to have lost many of the qualities that add value in a workplace.
Given that the stock of long-term unemployed people varies across the economic cycle, it is appropriate to
vary at least one of the elements of the incentive over time to minimise deadweight and maximise the impact.
This means that at least one of the eligibility criteria, the duration or the subsidy amount will vary, and this
refinement of the subsidy should be aligned with the degree to which employers require an incentive to hire
long-term unemployed people at a given point in time.
9.1 Eligibility criteria
The 2018 adjustments focus the programme on very long-term unemployed people and those over 50 by alter-
ing the eligibility criteria. This makes sense where the programme has been in operation for a number of years
and employers have presumably recruited those closest to the labour market and with the highest value to add
to firms. When unemployment is falling, those whose disadvantage is particularly acute may find employers are
reluctant to select them. At a time of increased focus on groups experiencing particular disadvantage, it makes
sense to target the subsidy at those cohorts by adjusting the eligibility criteria and focusing on those who will
be the focus of Pathways to Work 2020-2024, the labour market activation strategy.
There is also scope to vary the eligibility criteria with reference to the economic cycle. Emerging from a
recession, firms will have a choice of relatively high quality candidates. After a sustained period of growth, or as
the economy moves into recession, the most job-ready candidates will have been recruited and there is greater
need for the subsidy to alter employers’ perception of the net value of recruiting from the ranks of long-term
unemployed people.
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9.2 Duration of subsidy
It is worth recalling the channels by which the jobs subsidy is having an impact on the labour market. The
candidates who are perceived by employers as being most capable of adding value to a firm relative to price are
recruited without attaining the eligibility criterion of at least one year of unemployment. Those who reach the
eligibility criterion are then made more attractive by reducing the cost to the employer for the duration of the
subsidy (currently, two years). As they accrue experience, occupational skills, soft skills and sectoral knowledge,
they become more attractive to other employers.
In a buoyant jobs market, there is scope for reducing the duration of the subsidy from two years (to, for
example, one year). In practice, this means that, for a given allocation, more people could benefit from the
positive impact of the subsidy. As subsidised employees gain experience, they become more attractive to new
employers in the open market. To minimise the deadweight loss outlined in the preceding section, the objective
is to set the payment at the minimum that will entice employers to hire those who they would otherwise not
hire due to the duration of the unemployment spell (and, presumably, the interaction between duration of
unemployment and age).
9.3 Subsidy amount
The final variation that can be made to a subsidy like JobsPlus is to alter the amount of the subsidy according
to the economic cycle. The nominal value of the subsidy has not changed since 2013 (although, in practice,
altering the eligibility criteria is equivalent to altering the subsidy). In the event of periods of higher inflation, it
is worth considering whether, and how, it should be adjusted.
More significantly, the value to employers is different at various points in the business cycle, by sector and
by location.
9.4 Determining when subsidy elements should be varied
If either of the elements of the subsidy (duration, amount, and eligibility criteria) are to be adjusted, this should
be triggered by an identifiable labour market benchmark. This should be a selected indicator of labour market
buoyancy referencing relative or absolute values that outline how long-term unemployed people are faring.
Examples of triggers (all measured using Labour Force Survey data) include::
— when the number of long-term unemployed people exceeds 50,000 (25,700 in Q2 2020);
— when the number of long-term unemployed people exceeds 200,000 (last seen Q3 2012);
— when the number of long-term unemployed people exceeds 100,000 (last seen Q3 2016);
— when the long-term unemployed people make up more than half of all unemployed people (over the year
to Q2 2020, this has varied from one third to one fifth).
10 Data limitations and further developments
10.1 Operational data
To this end, understanding exactly how prospective participants have eligibility determined is critical. Given the
data limitations of the DEASP operational data, the qualification status for the 12-month or 18-month subsidy
is defined as a dichotomous response in each case. From an analytic perspective, two data recording practices
are suggested below, which would make the estimation of a counterfactual more straightforward and allow
for a slightly wider range of techniques to be applied, without causing significant operational burden. It would
be useful if the measurement of eligibility was recorded as the sum of different sequences of Live Register
payment receipt rather than as a dichotomous response, and a record of ineligible jobseekers who requested
to have eligibility checked was retained. This would allow non-participants to be matched with the greatest
precision.
10.2 External data sources
The employment data provided by the Revenue Commissioners (Irish taxation authorities) to the DEASP is of
variable quality in respect of its measurement of employment starts.Accordingly, the outcome measurement
preferred in this evaluation is the absence of receipt of a jobseeker payment rather than the presence of an
employment start in a precise period. Employment can be imputed from the contributions recorded in a given
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period. However, since these are recorded as the sum of contributions in a year rather than attributed to indi-
vidual weeks, it is not always possible to attribute weeks of insurable employment to periods coinciding with an
absence of unemployment. This means that it is not always possible to define precisely weeks of employment,
so as to be able to identify employment episodes over short periods as, for instance, on monthly basis.
This ambiguity about status over short periods is particularly acute where unemployed people are entitled
to be in receipt of a payment while working (casual claims) for up to three days in a seven-day period. In such
cases, it is difficult to disentangle i) periods where they are not receiving an unemployment payment and are
working, from ii) periods where they are not receiving an unemployment payment and are inactive.
At the beginning of 2019 the taxation authorities’ moved from a calendar year system to a requirement for
employers to report their employees’ pay and deductions as they are being paid. This system change provides
an opportunity for data transfer at higher frequency (for instance, monthly) to the DEASP, who represent the
Department with operational and policy responsibility for social insurance and, as such, is the co-owner of the
data. Increasing the periodicity of data exchange in line with the requirements on employers will add significantly
to the ability of the DEASP to estimate movements between unemployment and employment. This is an essential
requirement to improve the precision of estimates of the programme impact on unemployed people.
11 Conclusion
This evaluation seeks to provide evidence on the effectiveness of JobsPlus by estimating its impact on long-term
unemployed, who are the clients of the Irish PES. The evaluation approach is based on the estimation of the
counterfactual scenario for JobsPlus participants, to gauge what would have happened in the absence of the
programme.
The PES requires a flow of information about its clients, their outcomes and the extent to which certain
programmes enhance the labour market outcomes of participants. Similarly, at the policy design stage, policy
makers require robust evidence of what works to alleviate barriers to employment. They also need access to
data that points to groups that could most benefit from certain interventions so that appropriate interventions
can be designed with the minimum deadweight. Therefore, this evaluation attempts to provide an answer to
what measures are suitable for deployment and what component parts of the subsidy (eligibility criteria, sub-
sidy duration, and subsidy amount) can be adjusted to target particular groups or to align with the business cycle.
The impact of JobsPlus is estimated separately for the two treatment types: the e7,500 subsidy for em-
ployees who had been unemployed for between one and two years, and the e10,000 subsidy for employees
who had been unemployed for more than two years.
The effect for those benefiting from the two types of subsidy is measured after the completion of the
programme, on three different outcomes. The first is the probability of receiving unemployment related benefits,
measured on a monthly basis. The other two are annual measures of the number of weeks worked and earnings
from employment.
Data used for the analysis is taken from the Jobseekers Longitudinal Dataset (JLD) managed by the De-
partment of Employment Affairs and Social Protection (DEASP). This is an administrative database covering
unemployed individuals since 2004, which provides detailed information on employment, unemployment and
training episodes they experienced during their working career.
The identification strategy exploits different matching approaches, based on the following information: i)
month of entry in the eligibility condition to be able to receive the subsidy; ii) JobsPlus starting month; iii) number
of weeks worked in the four years preceding JobsPlus; and (iv) past working histories measured by receipt of
unemployment benefits.
The results point to a consistent estimate of the impact of JobsPlus, with participants faring better than
matched non-participants. After the end of the subsidy period, workers under JobsPlus are less likely to
claim unemployment benefits, with even bigger effects for those individuals who experienced longer periods in
unemployment before starting the programme. This positive impact is shown also by estimated results in terms
of weeks worked and earnings from employment.
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Appendix
Since the 1st of January 2018 the payment levels for JobsPlus are:
Under 25 years of age, on the Live Register and unemployed for at
least 104 days in the previous 6 months.
e7,500
Over 25 years of age, on the Live Register and unemployed for at
least 312 days in the previous 18 months.
e7,500
In receipt of jobseekers allowance transition payment (no
qualifying period applies).
e7,500
Persons with refugee status and are in receipt of jobseekers
allowance (no qualifying period).
e7,500
Persons less than 50 years of age, on the Live Register and
unemployed for at least 936 days in the previous 42 months.
e10,000
Over 50 years of age, on the Live Register and unemployed for at
least 312 days in the previous 18 months.
e10,000
For employments which commenced prior to 1st January2018 payment levels for JobsPlus are as follows:
Under 25 years of age, on the Live Register and unemployed for at
least 104 days in the previous 6 months.
e7,500
Over 25 years of age, on the Live Register and unemployed for at
least 312 days in the previous 18 months.
e7,500
In receipt of jobseekers allowance transition payment (no qualifying
periods applies).
e7,500
Persons with refugee status and in receipt of jobseekers allowance
(no qualifying period).
e7,500
Over 18 years of age, on the Live Register and unemployed for at
least 624 days in the previous 30 months. e10,000
Live Register
The Live Register is compiled from returns made for each local office to the Central Statistics Office by the
Department of Employment Affairs and Social Protection (DEASP). It comprises persons under 65 years of age
in the following classes:
— all claimants for Jobseeker’s Benefit (JB) excluding systematic short-time workers;
— applicants for Jobseeker’s Allowance (JA) excluding smallholders/farm assists and other self-employed
persons;
— other registrants including applicants for credited Social Welfare contributions but excluding those directly
involved in an industrial dispute.
The Live Register excludes claimants on jobseeker schemes who are 65 years of age and over. There was
no change to this exclusion criterion with the removal of the State Pension (Transition) Scheme from 1 January
2014. Persons aged 65 years can remain on a jobseeker scheme up to their next birthday but are not included in
the Live Register. Although they measure different labour market trends, there is a strong correlation between
the ILO unemployment rate, as measured in the Labour Force Survey, and the number of claimants for jobseeker
payments, who are not working part-time (ie excluding those on casual claims and credited contributions).
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Table 19: JobsPlus monthly expenditure ( e, ‘000s)
Year
Month 2016 2017 2018 2019
January 984.54 2,525.01 2,239.38 1,502.40
February 2,386.36 2,152.81 1,472.29
March 2,280.94 2,103.96 1,405.21
April 1,004.90 2,281.26 2,035.11 1,311.66
May 2,007.51 2,392.14 2,103.86 1,329.06
June 2,871.99 2,547.87 1,939.48 1,183.54
July 1,723.44 2,575.22 1,906.67 1,097.18
August 1,910.99 2,489.07 1,798.12 1,115.10
September 2,335.32 2,449.59 1,814.90 1,078.95
October 2,096.26 2,326.99 1,618.33 1,089.27
November 2,356.88 2,364.49 1,647.92 965.10
December 2,301.15 2,304.16 1,509.06
Total 19,592.97 28,923.08 22,869.59 13,549.76
Table 20: JobsPlus employee
No of JobsPlus Employees in Payment
Year
Month 2016 2017 2018 2019
January 4,046* 4765 5,062 3,281
February 4,401* 4,754 4,824 3,197
March 4,173* 4,837 4,665 3,102
April 2,590 4,851 4,507 2,962
May 3,616 5,077 4,563 2,873
June 4,470 5,246 4,413 2,720
July 3,507 5,365 4,301 2,566
August 3,745 5,434 4,211 2,526
September 4,253 5,435 4,029 2,406
October 4,317 5,307 3,782 2,333
November 4,562 5,252 3,659 2,233
December 4,624 5,217 3,528
Total employees supported in each year 8,380 8,960 7,556 4,949**
Table 21: JobsPlus employers
No of JobsPlus Employees in Payment
Year
Month 2016 2017 2018 2019
January 2,983* 3,571 3,811 2,633
February 3,222* 3,571 3,651 2,580
March 3,084* 3,641 3,534 2,505
April 1,913 3,648 3,445 2458
May 2,694 3,816 3,492 2,402
June 3,348 3,925 3,394 2,276
July 2,690 3,994 3,319 2,153
August 2,867 4,049 3,333 2,133
September 3,221 4,063 3,190 2,009
October 3,307 3,998 3,030 1,948
November 3,463 3,980 2,939 1,863
December 3,503 3,964 2,855
Total employers supported in each year: 5,811 6,180 5,469 3,795**
Notes:
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— Prior to transfer of JobsPlus data onto DEASP BOMi system, payments were made for a month in arrears,
i.e. numbers indicated in January 2016 refers to payments for December 2015 and so on.
— Value indicates those supported from January - November 2019 only.
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